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This dissertation argues that stormwater management is fragmented both at that vertical 
fragmentation (at the level of intergovernmental relations) and horizontal fragmentation (within 
the level of governments). The first essay focuses on the institutional arrangements used by 
states to implement stormwater management policies. Building on the race to the bottom 
literature, I examine the impact of the institutional arrangement centralization on state water 
quality in California, Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota. A five-year (2013-2018) permitting cycle 
was used to analyze five dimensions: formalism, coercion, education, prioritization, and 
accommodation.There is an inverse relationship between the quality of stormwater and the 
degree of centralization in the institutional arrangements adopted by state governments to 
implement their stormwater management policies. The second essay focuses on a local 
government's decision to join an inter-local agreement to comply with federal/state stormwater 
management policies. Building on the transaction cost framework, the study used a cross-
sectional design to analyze a case study. The case study consists of 119 cities subjected to 
stormwater regulation requirements in northern Texas during 2017. The dependent variable is the 
membership of the regional inter-local agreement, and the independent variables are the number 
of neighboring cities and population density. Community wealth, public works spending, 
stormwater fees, government type, and the percent of the population over 65 were used as 
control variables. Logistic regression was used for data analysis. This study concludes that the 
increase in the number of neighboring regulated local governments is associated with an increase 
in the likelihood of a decision by the regulated local government to join an interlocal agreement 
 
(ILA), as well as finding that an increase in the population density is associated with an increase 
in the likelihood of a decision by the regulated local government to join the ILA. In addition, the 
study found that the type of government also affects a decision to enter into a cooperative 
relationship to meet the regulative burdens associated with implementing the stormwater 
management policies imposed by state/federal governments. The results found in this dissertation 
contribute to bridging the gap in our knowledge on the impact of the institutional framework 
adopted by the states to implement environmental policy through empirically evaluating the 
effect of institutional arrangements (as represented in the States general MS4 permits) on the 
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Public policy implementation has received extensive attention in the research literature, 
especially regarding achieving public policy goals in light of institutional fragmentation. 
According to Farhang and Yaver (2016), the implementation of public policies in the United 
States of America is characterized by being scattered between several institutions and actors, 
making it possible to increase the contradiction and reduce the opportunities for joint work. In 
other words, the responsibility for implementing public policies is distributed among different 
levels of government (federal, state, and local governments), which in turn need to work jointly 
at the vertical and horizontal levels to avoid opportunistic behavior and negative externalities. 
Therefore, dealing with collective action problems does not depend merely on understanding the 
ecological characteristics and solutions related to the problem; rather, it also includes the 
institutional framework in which decisions are made, and solutions to the problem are selected 
and then implemented. Institutions can be defined as the rules that govern political decisions 
(Bickers & Williams, 2001). According to North (1991), “[i]nstitutions are the humanly devised 
constraints that structure political, economic, and social interaction” (p. 97). In this sense, 
institutions are designed to direct members’ behavior with collective action problems through 
formal or informal rules. However, institutions are fragmented. According to Biermann, 
Pattberg, and Asselt (2009, cited in Zelli, 2015, p.469), institutions can differ “in their character 
(organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies (public and private), their 
spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their [predominant] subject matter.” In other words, 
there is no specific framework or type of institution that affects public policies.  
On the contrary, the institutional frameworks and their components differ according to 
2 
the policy domain under consideration. In the field of environmental policies related to water, 
Adler (1994, cited in Adler, 2009a) identified sources of institutional fragmentation in the water 
policy domain that includes vertical fragmentation (at the level of intergovernmental relations) 
and horizontal fragmentation (within the level of governments). The term vertical fragmentation 
refers to the number of levels of government (federal, state, and local government) that overlap 
in their responsibilities, interests, and goals that they aim to achieve. The term horizontal 
fragmentation refers to the nature of the relationship between government units at the level and 
unit (a state with state or one local government with another).  
Concerning the vertical fragmentation, over the past century and continuing to the 
present, there have been many developments in intergovernmental relationships between 
governments in the federal system. Accordant to Shafritz, Russell, and Borick (2010), the 
dynamics of the intergovernmental relationship in the US federal framework can be seen from 
four viewpoints. The first viewpoint is dual federalism, which asserts that federal and state 
governments are theoretically distinct and separate. The second viewpoint is cooperative 
federalism, which argues that the national, state and local governments cooperate as interacting 
agents, working to solve common problems rather than conflicting. The third viewpoint is that of 
creative federalism, which is characterized by a focus on joint planning and decision-making 
among all levels of government in the management of intergovernmental programs. The final 
viewpoint is layer cake federalism, which sees federalism as involving the assignment of 
responsibilities to different government levels, namely, national, state, and local government. 
State governments have responsibility for public safety, education, and social welfare, among 
other concerns, while the national government’s responsibilities include national security and 
regulation of inter-State commerce. Regardless of the perspective on the federal relationships, 
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the local government is recognized as the unit responsible for the enforcement of a wide range of 
policies issued by the federal and state governments. Therefore, local governments cannot be 
seen as separate units operating outside the framework of intergovernmental relations. 
Concerning the implementation of public policies in light of the vertical fragmentation at 
the level of intergovernmental relations, Lyons and Lowery (1989) stated that there are two 
views on dealing with this fragmentation. The first viewpoint to the need for centralization of 
authority to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation by reducing the 
number of actors or units associated with an implementation process (Lyons and Lowery, 1989). 
The second point of view stems from local public economies, which argues for the importance of 
decentralization to provide opportunities for citizens to choose the basket of services that suits 
their orientations and individual needs. Thus, one fundamental proposition of the theory of local 
public economies is that the degree of centralization or decentralization in institutional 
arrangements affects the output of the policy within the vertical fragmentation at the level of 
intergovernmental relations.  
In addition to the influence of centralization or decentralization in institutional 
arrangements at the vertical fragmentation level, the implementation of public policies is 
influenced by the relationship between governments at the horizontal level. The regulations and 
standards imposed by the higher authorities can turn into regulatory burdens on the local 
governments. According to Esty (2016), compliance with the regulations and standards of the 
Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency and their counterpart in the States 
is associated with a cost paid either by the individual users or the local entities. Similarly, 
Conlan, Riggle, and Schwartz (1995) argued that the Unfunded Mandate Reform Act of 1995 
increased the already existing regulatory burdens on state and local governments by inserting 
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enforceable duty on them without coverage of expenses. In addition, Conlan, Riggle, and 
Schwartz (1995) stated that this unfunded mandate could cause state and local governments 
billions of dollars in compliance. The regulated local governments that the federal/state 
government requires to meet certain standards to comply with an unfunded mandate look for 
ways to reduce compliance costs. Therefore, local governments need to cooperate to meet the 
regulatory burdens of implementing public policies and achieve public policy objectives. 
Given the vertical and horizontal fragmentation of implementing public policies, this 
dissertation aims to build a conceptualization of a multilevel governance framework that 
accounts for the complexities of implementing stormwater management policies, by answering 
two questions: 
Q1: How do the institutional arrangements adopted to implement stormwater policies 
influence variation in stormwater quality at the state level? 
 
Q2: What influences variation in interlocal agreement (ILA) membership for stormwater 
regulatory compliance at the regional level? 
 
The first question addresses the implementation of stormwater management policies at 
the vertical level, while the second deals with the cooperation between local governments to 
comply with federal/state stormwater management policies at the horizontal level. The proposed 
conceptual framework facilitates an understanding of the complexities of implementing 
stormwater management policies at vertical and horizontal levels. In addition, the proposed 
conceptual framework adds the horizontal level to the polycentric approach, which is widely 
used to explain decentralized environmental policies (Homsy, Liu, & Warner, 2019).  
1.1 Defining the Collective Action Dilemma of Stormwater 
Attention to stormwater pollution is recent compared to other types of pollution resulting 
from human activity. According to Novotny (1995), environmentalists and governments first 
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became aware of the extent to which stormwater has polluted water resources during the 1960s 
and 1970s. During that period, parties interested in the issue of water quality became perplexed 
when the standards and legislation concerned with the treating of sewage water failed to reduce 
the level of pollution and raise the quality of water. It became apparent that there was another 
source of water pollution that was no less dangerous than sewage or the pollution resulting from 
factories discharging their waste into water bodies. Attention turned later to an investigation of 
the issue of stormwater and its impact on water pollution levels. Stormwater itself is part of the 
process of the water cycle in nature. The water cycle, in general, is manifested by the 
evaporation of water: the evaporated water turns into clouds, the clouds move and then become 
rain, and the rain runs in its natural paths and finally returns to the water surface. However, 
human intervention in this natural water cycle has made stormwater a threat to nature and 
society.  
The management of stormwater represents a collective action dilemma. First, it is 
necessary to define the concept of the social dilemma. Ostrom (1998) stated that a social 
dilemma occurs when individuals make short-term gains at the expense of the group's total gains. 
Therefore, in any setting that requires a collective action (a group effort to achieve a common 
outcome), a social dilemma will be present. Working from this definition, stormwater can be 
understood as representing a collective action dilemma in two respects. The first aspect of the 
stormwater collective action dilemma relates to maintaining the quality of water free from 
stormwater pollution. The collective action dilemma associated with benefiting from watersheds 
is well documented in the literature (Cowie & Borrett, 2005; Ostrom, 1990; Berardo & Scholz, 
2010). However, stormwater threatens the quality of water in these watersheds; thus, when no 
actor takes measures to reduce the contamination of the stormwater that flows into a water body, 
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all members who benefit from this body will suffer from the negative externalities. The 
collective action dilemma here is represented by the failure of one member to reduce stormwater 
pollution, leading to the whole group’s suffering the consequences. 
The other aspect of the stormwater collective action dilemma lies in the way stormwater 
is managed. According to Welty (2009), most local governments focus on transporting 
stormwater beyond their geographical boundaries as quickly as possible, which results in 
increasing the volume of the water transported toward the downstream neighboring local 
governments; thus, the downstream neighbors must deal with the negative externalities produced 
by the upstream cities' decisions. In other words, the decision of local governments to employ 
drainage networks that are highly effective and efficient in transporting water can increase the 
power and rate of the flow of water into the areas administered by neighboring governments. 
This, in turn, may lead to flooding or to the transfer of harmful waste from the source to the 
neighboring governments’ areas. The issue of stormwater pollution and stormwater management 
have direct impacts on both the environment and society. 
1.1.1 The Impact of Stormwater on the Environment 
Most studies related to the negative effects of stormwater on the environment in the 
1980s (a time which saw the beginning of legislative solutions to the problem at the national 
level) indicated stormwater is responsible for a high proportion of the pollution of water bodies 
in the United States. For example, Cunningham (1988) found that stormwater was responsible 
for over 75% of water pollution (cited in Novotny, 1995). As recently as 2017, the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (USEPA) reported that 46% of rivers/streams and 21% of the 
nation’s lakes were in a poor condition due to stormwater and other pollution sources such as 
agriculture and urban development. These figures show that stormwater affects the 
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environmental formation surrounding water bodies. Pollution carried by stormwater or melted 
snow water affects water bodies' chemical, biological, and physical properties (Baker, 2009a). 
Regarding chemical and biological considerations, pollutants carried by stormwater to water 
bodies affect the natural composition of these surfaces; thus, these polluted water bodies become 
unsupportive of the natural cycle. This, in turn, may affect the number of living creatures that 
inhabit these bodies of water, such as fish. In addition, polluted lakes may affect the surrounding 
environment. For example, pollution might contribute to the poisoning of animals that drink 
polluted water or feed on creatures that live in this water. 
Furthermore, the pollution caused by stormwater increases the speed of evaporation of 
water in water bodies, which may lead to their shrinkage or to dryness in the environment 
(Baker, 2009b). According to Novotny (1995), it is difficult to completely understand the full 
impact of stormwater pollution on the environment since the core of the problem lies in the 
stormwater management process. Therefore, the negative externalities of pollution caused by 
stormwater may exceed the indications of current reports on the subject. 
1.1.2 The Impact of Stormwater on Society 
The negative externalities of pollution caused by stormwater impact society in three 
areas: drinking water, floods, and property destruction. The USEPA report (2017) indicates 
contaminated water bodies are unsupportive for human activities such as fishing or swimming. 
However, the real danger lies in threats to drinking water supplies. Indeed, half of the rivers and 
one-fifth of the lakes in the U.S. have become unsuitable for drinking; thus, local governments 
must search for new sources to supply their communities with drinking water. In addition, the 
decrease in drinking water sources will increase the cost of water to local governments and 
society. The problems affecting drinking water may not be a direct result of stormwater 
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pollution, by contrast with flooding, which is a direct result of stormwater. With the decline of 
natural drainage systems, many American cities found themselves trapped by severe flooding 
waves during the first half of the 20th century (Baker, 2009b). According to Welty (2009), most 
cities have focused on transporting stormwater beyond their geographical boundaries as quickly 
as possible, which has resulted in an increase in the volume of the water moving toward the 
downstream cities; thus, the downstream cities have had to deal with negative externalities 
produced by the upstream cities' decisions. This stormwater also directly affects property through 
the process of displacing soils. The strength and volume of stormwater can cause the slipping of 
soil, which in turn may affect property values (Braden & Johnston, 2004). As property prices 
decrease, local governments lose part of their income through decreases in property tax. In light 
of these negative externalities affecting the environment and society, it is imperative to 
investigate effective and efficient stormwater pollution management.  
1.1.3 Causes of Stormwater Problems 
 Urban Development 
The relationship between urban development and environmental impacts is unmistakable. 
American cities have witnessed an increase in the urban population during the Industrial 
Revolution and the stages that followed. Migration to cities has multiplied over the past century. 
According to the Center for Sustainable Systems (2019), about 80% of the U.S. population lives 
in urban cities, and this proportion is expected to reach 90% by the year 2050. The increase in 
the urban population has led to an increase in urbanization and construction in cities. Urban areas 
include housing, commercial or government buildings, and factories, along with the 
transportation networks that connect these units. Various building activities have brought about 
fundamental changes in the natural landscape.  
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Natural ecosystems have solutions to deal with stormwater. However, with the increase 
of urban development and road building, many wetlands and vegetated floodplain habitats have 
been lost (Bledsoe & Booth, 2009). According to Bledsoe and Booth (2009), the loss of natural 
drainage systems creates multiple problems. For example, non-alluvial channels (routes 
constructed specifically by cities to transport stormwater) increase water transfer speed and 
reduce the absorption of stormwater to groundwater. In addition, natural drainage systems can 
filter some types of debris, such as rocks or falling trees. However, with the increase of 
urbanization, there has been an increase in chemical debris, which is difficult to deal with 
naturally and threatens to contaminate surface water (Bledsoe & Booth, 2009). 
Furthermore, the National Stormwater Quality Database (compiled with support from the 
EPA) reported in 2018 that all rain samples collected from six types of urban land use (freeways, 
industrial sites, open space areas, and residential, commercial, and institutional sites) contained 
environmental pollutants. According to the National Stormwater Quality Database—NSQD 
project report (2018), the size and type of pollution varies from site to site. For example, roads 
are at the forefront of pollution sources containing copper; however, we find that open areas are 
the greatest sources of soil pollution (NSQD, 2018).  
 Stormwater Discharge Without Treatment 
Many American cities had already adopted standards to deal with sewage water before 
the federal government took legislative measures to ensure that sewage was treated before it was 
pumped into nature again (Winter, 1993). The Clean Water Act (1972) provided funds and 
required the creation of publicly-owned treatment works (POTWs); the act contributes to treating 
sewage water and maintaining water quality. According to the USEPA (2016), “[a]s of January 
1, 2012, 14,748 publicly-owned wastewater treatment plants were serving 238.2 million 
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Americans, or 76 percent of the population” (p.25). However, there is less stormwater regulation: 
approximately 7,450 local governments discharge stormwater without treatment (USEPA, 2016, 
p. 20). These local governments collect stormwater through drainage systems separate from the 
sewage treatment system. Drainage networks serve to transport water and re-pump it into the 
torrential streams of stormwater, transporting it into water bodies. 
Two important consequences result from discharging stormwater without treatment. The 
first effect is the transport of pollutants carried by stormwater into water bodies. All construction, 
chemical, or sensory waste, scavenging, and pesticides used in home gardens will be swept away 
by stormwater into water bodies. The other consequence is an increased probability of flooding. 
According to Bledsoe and Booth (2009), the drainage networks built to transport stormwater 
contributes to increasing the strength and speed of the stormwater flow; thus, they may increase 
the water overload of the receiving water body. In other words, the more effective the 
stormwater drainage networks are in the process of transportation and the speed of transport, the 
greater the likelihood of flooding due to the increased levels of water bodies is. In contrast, 
natural drainage systems can slow down the flow of stormwater, which will allow the water 
surface to gradually absorb the excess stormwater, thus reducing the possibility of floods. The 
following section turns to the history of efforts made by governments to deal with the negative 
effects of stormwater.  
1.2 Fragmentation of Stormwater Policy Solutions Across Levels of Governance 
In the important study of stormwater management, three problems have been recognized 
as essential: limiting pollution of stormwater to surface water, regulation of the stormwater 
management practices of local governments, and the joining of horizontal solutions to manage 
the stormwater problem. Each of these areas is related to a specific dimension of the problem of 
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stormwater. Beginning with the quality of stormwater, it is clear that finding an effective means 
to raise the quality of stormwater is essential to reduce stormwater pollution of surface water. In 
addition, local governments are responsible for providing stormwater management services; 
therefore, they must adopt effective plans to deal with the problem. Likewise, local governments 
must cooperate to control the downside of stormwater management and increase the efficiency of 
dealing with the problem by reducing redundancy in implementing solution efforts. Considering 
the previously mentioned dimensions, we find that the history of dealing with the problem of 
stormwater can be framed in terms of the local response, the response at the level of state 
governments, and the response at the federal government level. 
1.2.1 Local Policy Solutions 
Historically, local governments have been responsible for dealing with issues that 
concern their citizens. Regarding the problem of stormwater, local governments have varied in 
their treatment of the issue, taking two opposing approaches. According to Adler (2009b), local 
governments have used either “civil law” or the notion of the “common enemy” to deal with the 
issue of stormwater drainage. Under the “civil law” approach, property owners cannot make 
changes in the natural streams on their land without bearing the cost of all the damage caused by 
the changes; thus, owners' ability to construct stormwater drainage systems has been restricted. 
In contrast, local governments that follow the “common enemy” approach allow landowners to 
make any changes to the water course in their lands, regardless of the damage, as long as it is not 
intentional. Both methods are applied through local ordinances related to zoning or construction 
permits (Adler, 2009b).  
However, local governments (in states that did not adopt solutions to the problem and 
before the solutions adopted by the federal government were implemented) did not pay attention 
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to the negative effects of stormwater pollution. According to Tyer (1993), local governments 
have focused on building roads and service facilities for residents without stormwater 
management. At the beginning of the last century, it became clear to local governments that 
stormwater threatened people's lives through the rise of the water level of rivers and the 
disruption of transportation networks (Welty, 2009). In searching for quick solutions to the 
problem, some local governments have established stormwater drainage networks connected to 
sewage systems, contributing to increases in the pollution of water bodies (Adler, 2009b). The 
poor performance of local governments in dealing with stormwater problems led some states to 
form their own policies before the federal government intervened to solve the problem. 
1.2.2 State Policy Solutions 
A group of states took measures to deal with water quality in general and stormwater 
management in particular. For example, some northern states (such as New York, Pennsylvania, 
and New Jersey) adopted policies that regarding pollution pumping by factories and sewage 
networks in the mid-1920s (Paavola, 2006). On the other hand, the problem of stormwater 
management was recognized in a limited number of states. Among these states, California was 
one of the first to adopt legislation to deal with stormwater. In 1949, California adopted the 
Dickey Water Pollution Act, which established the State Water Pollution Control Board 
(SWRCB) and nine Regional Boards to oversee and enforce the State’s pollution prevention and 
abatement program (Water Education Foundation, 2013). The SWRCB was responsible for 
enforcing the State’s pollution program. In addition, California instituted the Porter-Cologne 
Water Quality Control Act of 1969, which increased the power of the SWRCB regarding 
pollution prevention. The California SWRCB has become a major player in implementing 
federal stormwater management policies. 
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However, Tyer (1993) stated that state governments had not had an effective role in 
finding legislative solutions to stormwater pollution. The ineffective role of the states may be 
attributed to the fact that most states were concerned with reducing costs for taxpayers and 
businesses. The passing of any legislation related to managing stormwater meant an increase in 
cost to the state's citizens. Therefore, most of the states depended on the practices followed by 
local governments to deal with stormwater. This variation in the states’ roles in dealing with 
water pollution prompted the federal government to intervene. 
1.2.3 Federal Policy Solutions 
Legislation dealing with stormwater has been part of water legislation in general. The 
evolution of general water policy in the United States has gone through several historical phases 
(see Appendix A). According to Gerlak (2005), water policy has undergone a number of 
historical phases that have shaped the current features of water management. Essentially, water 
management rights were the provenance of state or local governments during the pre-New Deal 
period. However, the federal government increased its role in water management through a series 
of post-New Deal legislation through the mid-1980s. Since the mid-1980s, and especially since 
the passing of the 1987 Clean Water Act, there has been a decentralized process in implementing 
water policies. 
Within this outline of the history of water policies, the Clean Water Act of 1972 was the 
first policy that addressed stormwater pollution at the national level. The Clean Water Act of 
1972 aimed to reduce water pollution by reducing the discharge from pollution sources through a 
permission system (Gerlak, 2005). Moreover, the Clean Water Act of 1972 tasked the USEPA 
with developing National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System—NPDES permits (Adler, 
2009a). NPDES permits involve two types of standards, namely, technology-based standards and 
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water quality-based limits. The technology-based standards are techniques determined by the 
EPA to be the best ways to deal with the source of pollution (Adler, 2009a). The water quality-
based limits designate the amount of water needed to achieve water quality (Adler, 2009a). 
However, the Clean Water Act of 1972 did not identify sources of pollution or the identification 
of stormwater as a source of pollution that threatens water quality (Dolowitz, 2015). Therefore, 
the Clean Water Act of 1987 introduced amendments for stormwater management. 
 According to Copeland (2006), previous legislation had contributed to reducing 
pollution from industrial and municipal sources, but it gave little attention to the pollution caused 
by stormwater discharge from urban areas; thus, the Clean Water Act of 1987 added new 
requirements under Section 319 to control for stormwater discharge. Section 319 required the 
local government to establish best management practices (BMPs) in six areas under the 
minimum control measures (MCMs) to deal with stormwater discharge in accordance with 
NPDES permit requirements set by the USEPA. The MCMs included public education and 
outreach, public participation in the annual Stormwater Management Program (SWMP), illicit 
discharge detection and elimination of non-stormwater sources from their storm sewer system, 
management of construction site runoff, management of post-construction site runoff, and good 
housekeeping in municipal operations (USEPA National Menu of BMP, n.d.). Moreover, the 
amendments to the Clean Water Act of 1987 applied to all cities that operated separate storm 




Figure 1.1: The MS4 Permit Structure 
 
 
1.2.4 The Fragmentation of Implementing the MS4 
According to the USEPA (2009), there were two phases in implementing new NPDES 
permits. Phase I began in 1990 and targeted all cities with a population of 100,000 or higher 
16 
based on 1990 U.S. Census Bureau estimates, and the total number of subjected entities 
exceeded 800 (USEPA, 2009). The implementation of Phase II began in 1998 and targeted all 
cities with a population under 100,000 from 1990 U.S. Census Bureau estimates (USEPA, 2009). 
NPDES permits regulated the 4% of U.S. land where 80% of the U.S. population lived (USEPA, 
2009). In addition, the USEPA (2009) data indicate that approximately 7,000 permits were 
issued by both the EPA and the States to the subjected MS4 entities, including cities, counties, 
non-traditional local governments, public universities, and individual businesses. Although the 
legislation covered many US cities, the implementation of the project suffers from numerous 
problems.  
Figure 1.2: Stormwater Management Fragmentation across Different Levels of Government 
 
 
Although the legislation covers many US cities, the implementation of the project suffers 
from vertical and horizontal fragmentation. By looking at Figure 1.2, vertical fragmentation 
involves dividing the responsibility for implementing the program among the federal, state, and 
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local governments. The role of the federal government includes setting the policy requirement. In 
return, state governments choose the institutional framework for implementing policies. Each 
state is free to choose its own institutional approach (centralized or decentralized) for 
implementing stormwater management policies; thus, the implementation of stormwater policies 
becomes divided into several types of institutional frameworks that aim at meeting the 
requirements set by the federal government. In simple terms, implementing current stormwater 
management policies can be likened to a race that gives the contestants the freedom to choose the 
means and tools they desire to reach the desired goal. Depending on the institutional framework 
chosen by the state, local governments are obligated to fulfill the requirements imposed on them 
by higher authorities within the vertical fragmentation.   
The horizontal fragmentation of implementing stormwater management policies is 
represented by the need for joint action between more than one organization in the 
implementation process at each level. For example, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency 
and the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers need to work collectively to set the federal requirements. 
On the other hand, states need to work together because individual choices of a state can have an 
effect on the outcome of other verses. For example, if a state adopts a rapid drainage mechanism 
for stormwater, it may increase water flow in other states. On the contrary, if a state established a 
stormwater recycling program, water shares in the other states will decrease. The same dilemma 
of collective workers can be carried over to the decisions of local governments within a single 
state. Therefore, implementing current rainwater policies requires an understanding of the 
complexity associated with vertical and horizontal fragmentation.  
1.3 The Need for a Multilevel Governance Framework to Understanding Fragmentation in 
the Implementation of Publica Policies 
 
According to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development—OECD 
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(2010), the implementation of environmental policies is affected by the arrangement between the 
governments at different levels on the one hand and the cooperation between governments at the 
same level. In other words, to achieve effectiveness in implementing public policies, two 
questions must be discussed: How does the adopted institutional framework to deal with vertical 
fragmentation affect policy outcomes? And what motivates the local governments to work 
together to meet the legislative burden resulting from implementing the policies imposed on 
them by the higher governments? Several theories attempt to answer each of these questions, the 
most prominent of which is the local public economies and its polycentric approach vs. the race 
to the bottom theory on the vertical institutional fragmentation side and transaction costs on the 
horizontal institutional fragmentation side. 
The theory of local public economies argued that regulating the environmental pollution 
must be done through a polycentric approach that includes the constitutional level where the 
rules are set to constitute the "collective choice" of the actors at lower levels, the collective 
choice level where the arrangements and decisions are made regarding implementing the 
constitutional choice, and the operational levels where the decisions are implemented in 
accordance with the arrangements and decisions that were made at the collective choice level 
(Cowie and Borrett, 2005). This approach argues for giving local governments more power in the 
implementation process, i.e., supporting decentralization in implementing public policies. On the 
other hand, the race to the bottom theory argument is that states will adopt relaxed environmental 
legislation to compete with other states in attracting economic development; thus, states will 
adopt more decentralization institutional to enforce national environmental policies, giving them 
an advantage in their competition with other states (Konisky, 2007). In other words, the conflict 
revolves around the effectiveness of concentrating the authority of policy implementation in the 
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hand of one government versus dividing the authority of policy implementation on several 
governments at different levels of government. Thus, the adopted institutional arrangement of 
implement public policies at the vertical level affects policy outcomes. 
On the horizontal institutional fragmentation side, transaction cost theory is widely used 
by researchers to investigate the reasons why local governments cooperate (Andrew, 2009). 
During the nineties, there was great pressure coming for the New Public Management reforms on 
the government to reduce costs by producing services through external contracting (Milward & 
Editor, 1996). In light of this cost-cutting pressure, governments decisions regarding the internal 
production of the service or contracting it out (while preserving ownership and liability 
associated with the service) were linked to a number of transaction costs risks factors that 
include service-specific characteristics, the degree of competition, goal incongruence of the 
contracting parties (Brown & Potoski, 2003). In addition, the geographic location of the local 
government impacts their ability to have a sufficient number of suppliers—that is, the existence 
of a competitive market for the service (Morgan, Hirlinger, & England,1988; Morgan & 
Hirlinger, 1991). Therefore, it can be said that the decision on contractual relationships may be 
limited to whether the impact of the geographical location of the local government is positive or 
negative about joining contractual relations for the implementation of the service. 
Therefore, understanding the issue of fragmentation in the implementation of stormwater 
management policies can be done by looking at the relationship between the level of 
centralization in the institutional framework adopted by the states to implement the policy and 
the policy outcomes, as well as by looking at the reasons that can affect the decision of local 
governments to enter into cooperative relationships to meet the legislative burdens resulting from 
the requirements of implementing stormwater management policies. Combing an understanding 
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of the impact of the institutional arrangements chosen by state governments to implement 
stormwater management policies at the vertical level with an understanding of the reasons why 
local governments enter into cooperative relationships at the horizontal level to meet the 
regulatory burdens imposed on them by federal/state governments presents a multilevel 
governance framework to understanding fragmentation in the implementation of stormwater 
policies since it studies the vertical links between local and state governments and its impact on 
water quality, as well as the relationship between local governments on the regional level. 
1.4 Stormwater Quality at the State Level and Cooperation for Stormwater Regulatory 
Compliance 
 
1.4.1 Stormwater Quality at the State Level 
In light of the vertical fragmentation of implementing stormwater policies, Ringquist 
(1993) stated that “while we know a great deal about environmental politics at the federal level, 
we know very little about the politics behind state environmental policy. We know even less 
about the consequences that environmental regulations have had for environmental quality (i.e., 
the extent to which these efforts have succeeded in protecting the environment)” (p.xiii). In other 
words, there is a need to know the frameworks adopted by the states to implement public policies 
and know the impact of these institutional arrangements on the outcomes of politicians. 
Nevertheless, there are two main types of research literature related to the question of water 
quality and institutional arrangements. The first type is technical studies that rely on USEPA data 
from samples in the nine sectors where the regional agency offices are located; they include both 
engineering and environmental studies (Moore, Rodak, Ahmed, & Vogel, 2018; Comstock et al., 
2012; National Research Council, 2008). This type of study omits the variation in the 
institutional arrangement between the states, which is reflected in the quality of the samples 
extracted from different locations. In other words, this research literature considers the 
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institutional structures for dealing with stormwater in the states to be a mystery box; thus, they 
should be omitted from the study. The second type of research literature on water quality in 
general and stormwater, in particular, discusses the role of states in the context of a specific case 
study (i.e., the study of only one state) (McDonald & Naughton, 2019; Aguilar & Dymond, 
2016). This type of literature does not provide a complete picture of the impact of the types of 
institutional structures of the states on water quality and the reduction of stormwater pollution. 
Therefore, this dissertation contributes to bridging the gap on the impact of the institutional 
framework adopted by the states to implement environmental policy through empirically 
evaluating the role of the institutional arrangement (as represented in the States general MS4 
permits) on the policy output (reducing the level of stormwater pollution). In addition, this paper 
focuses on the institutional arrangement used by states to implement stormwater management 
policies. Building on race to the bottom literature, the impact of the institutional arrangements 
centralization on the state water quality are examined. The paper uses a qualitative approach to 
compare and evaluate the variation in the state institutional arrangement in a sample of four case 
studies that include California, Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota. 
1.4.2 Cooperation for Stormwater Regulatory Compliance 
In light of the horizontal fragmentation of implementing stormwater policies, local 
governments found themselves burdened by the responsibility of implementing the stormwater 
management policies in two ways: bearing the cost of implementation and avoiding the negative 
externalities non-compliance by other local governments. As a result of not including regulatory 
burdens as one reason for entering into an interlocal agreement—ILA, the current ILA literature 
(Carr, Gerber, & Lupher, 2007; LeRoux & Carr, 2007; Wood, 2006) does not discuss the factors 
influencing the regulated local government’s decision to join ILA.  In addition, there is a 
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disagreement about the impact of cooperation and compliance with the regulative burdens within 
the environmental management literature (Youm, 2014; Hoornbeek, Beechey, & Pascarella, 
2016). Therefore, this dissertation empirically examines factors affecting the regulated local 
government’s decision to join ILA, which will expand interlocal cooperation and ILAs literature 
beyond public services provision/delivery to link it with regulatory burdens as a reason for 
joining an ILA. Building on the transaction costs framework, the paper examines the context of 
cooperation to comply with federal/state stormwater management policies. The paper uses a 
cross-sectional design to analyze a case study, and the unit of analysis is subjected cities. The 
case study consists of 119 cities subjected to the NPDES MS4 requirements in northern Texas 
during 2017.  
1.5 Contributions to Theory and Practice 
The multilevel governance framework to understanding fragmentation in the 
implementation of stormwater policies presented by this dissertation provides several contributes 
to theory and practice. On the theoretical side, the presented multilevel governance framework 
facilitates the understating of the linkage between the institutional arrangement at the state level 
and its impact on policy outcomes on the one hand. On the other hand, the proposed framework 
contributes to understanding the decision of local governments to enter into cooperative 
relationships to meet the legislative burdens imposed on them by the state and federal 
government. By understanding the impact of diversity in the institutional framework adopted by 
states to implement public policies on policy outcomes as well as the motives for entering into 
collaborative relationships at the regional level, researchers can better understand the relationship 
between vertical and horizontal fragmentation in the implementation of stormwater management 
policies.  
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Another contribution of this dissertation can be the use of qualitative and quantitative 
methods to investigate the questions posed. The qualitative methodology used to compare the 
case studies contributes to giving a more in-depth analysis of the institutional framework and 
contributes to responding to the need for a diversity of research methodologies in the field of 
public administration (Ospina, Esteve, & Lee, 2018). According to Ospina, Esteve, and Lee 
(2018), there are a limited number of studies in the field of public administration that use 
political documents as a source of qualitative data, let alone analyze them, which enhances the 
impact of this study on expanding the scope of research methodologies in the field of public 
administration. Therefore, future studies can use the current study methodology to apply it to 
another issue within the public administration's interest. 
The other side of the contributions of this study lies in the fact that it gives attention to 
the issue of managing stormwater, which did receive limited attention from public administration 
literature. However, it is an issue that concerns the public administration as much as other 
disciplines. According to Dhakal and Chevalier (2016), specialized engineers mostly do 
stormwater management under a unified public work system or independent departments. The 
perception of the specialization of stormwater management influenced the way this issue was 
addressed in the literature on local cooperation. Such perception of the specialization of 
stormwater management leads ILA researchers to examine public works completely or not 
allocate any details about the stormwater management issue. Therefore, this study put the issue 
of managing stormwater upfront in the field of public administration. 
Finally, the results of this dissertation will help public policymakers in the states to 
compare the performance of their institutional framework with other institutional frameworks; in 
turn, this will help improve their choices about dealing with stormwater or other environmental 
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policies. In addition, the results will assist professionals in exploring the institutional frameworks 
in which they work within their states, which should help them increase their performance and 
improve their job outcomes. Nevertheless, the results will assist local government officials in 
identifying the impact of geographical boundaries and other factors on the decision to join ILA 
and take advantage of cooperative relationships to meet the legislative burdens imposed on them 
by the state and federal government. 
1.6 Organization of the Dissertation 
Chapter 1 discusses the issue of vertical and horizontal fragmentation in the 
implementation of public policies and presents the research questions that this dissertation aims 
to answer. In addition, the importance of studying the issue of stormwater management and its 
policy solutions was discussed. Moreover, the chapter provides an overview of the polycentric 
approach and its relation with the proposed multilevel governance framework to understanding 
fragmentation in the implementation of stormwater policies. The chapter also provides an 
overview of the dissertation's contribution to theory and practice. Finally, this chapter concludes 
with an overview of the content of the chapters of this dissertation. 
Chapter 2 illustrates the analytical framework adopted by this dissertation. The chapter 
starts by present the vertical fragmentation of stormwater management via discussing the 
relationship between the executive/legislative/judicial powers at the federal level, the 
relationship between the federal and state government, and the relationship between state and 
local governments. In addition, the chapter presented the relation between institutional 
arrangement centralization and vertical fragmentation. This chapter also discusses the 
competition and cooperation between local governments at the horizontal level. Moreover, it 
discusses the stormwater regulation burdens at the horizontal level. The chapter concludes by 
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offering an overview of the empirical implementation of the proposed framework for analysis. 
Chapter 3 presents the first paper, a qualitative study focusing on the institutional 
arrangement used by states to implement stormwater management policies. This chapter presents 
literature on stormwater quality to answer the proposed research question. In addition, the 
chapter presents the proposed theoretical framework to explain the role of the institutional 
arrangement in the states on the issue of stormwater quality. The chapter then discusses the 
research methodology for investigating the research question and then follows a discussion and 
conclusion of the study results.  
Chapter 4 presents the second paper, a quantitative study focusing on the local 
government's decision to join ILA to comply with federal/state stormwater management policies. 
This chapter presents literature on stormwater regulatory burdens compliance and ILA to answer 
the proposed research question. In addition, the chapter presents the proposed theoretical 
framework to explain the role of geographical location and population density on the decision of 
local governments to enter into cooperative relations to meet the legislative burdens associated 
with the implementation of stormwater policies. The chapter then discusses the research 
methodology for investigating the research question and then follows a discussion and 
conclusion of the study results. 
Chapter 5 presents this dissertation conclusion. The chapter begins with an introduction 
about the goal of this dissertation and the steps it took to achieve the goal. In addition, the 
chapter discusses the most important results and their applications. The chapter also provides a 
summary of the most prominent contributions of this dissertation. The chapter concludes with a 
discussion of the limitation faced by the study, how they were overcome, and what the research 




As previously mentioned, this dissertation builds on the polycentric approach to provide a 
multilevel governance framework to understanding fragmentation in the implementation of 
stormwater policies that combined vertical and horizontal fragmentation. Investigating the 
implementation of stormwater policies between the various levels of government requires an 
understanding of the overall institutional framework that combines the three levels of 
government: federal, state, and local. In addition, it requires an understanding of the controversy 
surrounding the adoption of centralized or decentralized institutional arrangements in response to 
vertical fragmentation. On the other side, investigating the implementation of stormwater 
policies at the horizontal level requires an understanding of a mixture of competition and joint 
action between local governments.  
To illustrate the analytical framework adopted by this dissertation, the next section 
presents the vertical fragmentation of stormwater management via discussing the relationship 
between the executive/legislative/judicial powers at the federal level, the relationship between 
the federal and state government, and the relationship between state and local governments. In 
addition, the relation between institutional arrangement centralization and vertical fragmentation 
is presented. This is followed by a discussion of competition and cooperation between local 
governments at the horizontal level. In addition, stormwater regulation burdens at the horizontal 
level is discussed. This concludes by offering an overview of the empirical implementation of 
the proposed framework for analysis.  
2.1 Vertical Fragmentation of Stormwater Management 
2.1.1 The Federal Level 
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As mentioned previously, the federal government eventually intervened in managing the 
water pollution issue by passing the Clean Water Act of 1972. However, stormwater 
management was absent from federal legislation until the passing of the MS4 permit 
amendments under the Clean Water Act of 1987. Congress has adopted a centralized but flexible 
policy in creating permit requirements (Copeland, 2006; Adler, 2009a). From the central 
perspective, the US Congress granted a number of exclusive powers to the USEPA to set 
standards that represent the minimum limits that must be adhered to by states to achieve the 
policy goals (aiming to reduce the level of water pollution caused by stormwater). According to 
the USEPA (n.d.), the Clean Water Act gave the agency the following authority: 
1- Section 301(a) prohibits the discharge of any pollutants into navigable waters except 
in compliance with the CWA (typically implemented in an NPDES permit issued 
under Section 402). 
2- Section 304(h) requires the EPA to establish test procedures to measure pollutants in 
Clean Water Act programs, such as the NPDES. 
3- Section 501(a) authorizes the EPA to prescribe the regulations necessary to carry out 
functions under the Act. 
Besides the authority to set standards, the US Congress also gave the USEPA a number of 
enforcement-related authorities, such as the authority to issue permits or delegate the authority to 
issue permits to states. Finally, the US Congress gave the USEPA and the US Army Corps of 
Engineers the authority to monitor the national water quality.  
Although the Supreme Court granted the federal government water proprietary rights 
(Arizona vs. California, 1963), the complete centralization of stormwater policies would be faced 
by a lack of cooperation from both state and local levels of governments. Two main elements 
that may have motivated the non-cooperation from both state and local governments in achieving 
policy goals were the already-existing solutions and the economic impact of policies. First, there 
were disparities related to the historical background of dealing with the problem of stormwater 
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between states, which could create a coordination problem between the national solutions and the 
solutions applied at the other levels. For example, states such as California have legislation that 
authorizes stormwater management. Indeed, there are norms used to govern stormwater 
management in most states; thus, the U.S. Congress needed a way to integrate the existing 
solutions to the stormwater problem with the national solutions. The other factor is the economic 
impacts, as implementing legislative solutions passed by the U.S. Congress might increase the 
cost to taxpayers and businesses that must meet the requirements of the legislation. As 
previously mentioned, most states have refrained from adopting legislative solutions to 
stormwater for fear of economic costs. Therefore, the U.S. Congress has combined the 
centralized policy with certain flexibility measures to motivate the other levels of government to 
cooperate in implementing the national solution. The flexibility measures taken by the U.S. 
Congress to address the possibility of a lack of cooperation and coordination include giving the 
USEPA authority to delegate the permitting process to the states and providing some federal 
financial support to the states to meet the requirements of the legislation. According to the 
USEPA (n.d.), the agency has the right to negotiate, delegate, or withdraw the authorization of 
licenses from the states. As of 2015, 47 states had obtained either full or partial authority over 
the process of issuing permits related to addressing the issue of stormwater (USEPA, n.d.).  
2.1.2 Federal-State Fragmentation 
Questions of primacy or authority in implementing environmental programs have opened 
a new era in the relationship between the federal and state governments. Not all states have 
achieved primacy in this relationship, and the acquisition has not taken place simultaneously. On 
the contrary, a few states acquired this authority during the 1990s, and some states, such as 
Alaska, achieved primacy as late as 2008. The difference in the states’ acquisition of authority 
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over the implementation of environmental programs has attracted the interest of researchers in 
this domain. For example, Crotty (1987) was one of the first researchers to study the 
phenomenon of states' voluntary acquisition of environmental programs. In examining the rate of 
adoption of the program by the states, Crotty (1987) found that a close relationship between the 
USEPA regional offices and the states and the existence of a previous attitude toward the 
environment on the part of state governments have a positive effect on the adoption rate. 
Nevertheless, Crotty (1987) found that some regional offices (such as USEPA regional offices 
IV and VI) have played a role in easing states' requirements to compel them to take over 
responsibility for implementing the regulations. Similarly, Hays, Esler, and Hays (1996) found 
that the strength of a state's commitment to implement the environmental policies that they 
undertook to implement varied according to the political characteristics of the state, such as the 
direction of public opinion regarding the environment and the professionalism of legislators in 
the state.  
Furthermore, Chang, Sigman, and Traub (2014) argued that states with pro-
environmental outlooks aim to strengthen measures by acquiring regulatory enforcement 
authority. In contrast, some researchers have argued that the reasons states take over the power to 
implement water protection legislation lie in their desire to reduce enforcement effectiveness 
(Woods, 2005; Sigman, 2005). According to this literature, states rely on measures taken by 
neighboring states to ensure water quality (free-riding) or reduce the quality of enforcement and 
monitoring to maintain/attract economic development. In addition, some researchers have argued 
that the permit system itself is ineffective and creates problems of delay in administrative 
procedures, which hinder the process of economic development (Ulibarri, Cain, & Ajami, 2017). 
Therefore, the literature is still far from settling on why states seek to acquire the authority to 
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implement water quality regulations. 
2.1.3 State-Local Fragmentation 
As stated, Section 319 of the CWA of 1987 requires the local government to adopt best 
management practices (BMPs) in six areas under the minimum control measures (MCMs) to deal 
with stormwater discharge in accordance with NPDES permit requirements set by the USEPA. 
Thus, local governments are the units targeted for the implementation of national solutions to the 
stormwater problem. However, being given the primacy or authority over implementing 
environmental programs, states have become responsible for achieving program objectives 
(Crotty, 1987). In other words, any state that has acquired a stormwater permit authority has 
become responsible for reducing stormwater pollution and maintaining the quality of surface 
water within its geographical limits. According to Copeland (2006), the Clean Water Act of 1987 
did not provide a comprehensive breakdown of the process of managing the application of the 
permit as it did regarding industrial sources of pollution. Therefore, each of the 47 states that 
have the authority to issue permits has its own institutional framework for program 
implementation, which is reflected in the differences seen in their ability to achieve the 
objectives of the legislation. 
2.1.4 Institutional Arrangement Centralization and Vertical Fragmentation  
Concerning the implementation of public policies in light of the vertical fragmentation at 
the level of intergovernmental relations, Lyons and Lowery (1989) stated that there are two 
views on dealing with this fragmentation. The first viewpoint to the need for centralization of 
authority to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of policy implementation by reducing the 
number of actors or units associated with an implementation process (Lyons and Lowery, 1989). 
According to Lyons and Lowery (1989), this approach defines centralization as the consolidation 
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of authority in a single governmental body that produces and delivers service; thus, policies 
become more focused, ensuring a uniform response to public policy problems. For example, a 
single government or government agency is given the authority to solve a problem. It is 
empowered to impose its policy solution on all the bodies under its authority regardless of their 
input, context, abilities... et. The second point of view stems from local public economies (please 
see section 2.2.1. for more detail about the assumptions of this view), which argues for the 
importance of decentralization to provide opportunities for citizens to choose the basket of 
services that suits their orientations and individual needs (Lyons and Lowery, 1989). According 
to Lyons and Lowery (1989), this approach defines decentralization as reallocating the authority 
of the central authorities to the nearest government unit to the citizen, which will contribute to 
meeting the needs of their citizens within their jurisdiction boundaries. In other words, the 
government or the governmental body that provides the service directly to the citizen should 
wield the greatest amount of power. For example, the power of the city must be greater than that 
of the state or the federal government. Such conceptualization of authority decentralization aims 
at making local government more responsive toward the problems within their domain. On the 
other hand, the concept of centralization aims to overcome the problem of coordination and free-
ride problems that may occur as a result of multiple responses to the same public policy issues. 
The degree of centralization in the institutional frameworks pursued by the states is 
linked to the concept of competition. The race to the bottom theory argues that states will adopt 
relaxed environmental legislation to compete with other states in attracting economic 
development; thus, states will adopt greater institutional decentralization to enforce national 
environmental policies, which will give them an advantage in their competition with other states 
(Konisky, 2007). In other words, the states will give a high degree of discretion to local 
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governments to meet the legal requirements associated with federal environmental legislation to 
attract economic development. Therefore, the policy outcome in the state can be affected by the 
institutional arrangement that the state chooses to implement the policies. 
On stormwater management, we find a variation in the degrees of centralization among 
the states. In light of the lack of regulation of how the states administer the permits, local 
governments are obligated to operate within the institutional frameworks established by the 
states to administer legislation related to stormwater. According to Adler (2009a), the 
institutional arrangement adopted by states to manage stormwater legislation can be categorized 
by geographical location or the degree of institutional centralization. For example, the eastern 
states entrust managing stormwater management legislation to a single agency such as a 
statewide environmental agency. In contrast, the western U.S. states task the managing of 
stormwater legislation to more than one agency or level; this is the case with the state of 
California. Another area in which the differences in institutional frameworks between states can 
be seen is the degree of centralization. For example, in Texas, local governments have greater 
discretion in setting the effluent limits (Storm Water Cooperative Agreement Handbook, 2009). 
In contrast, we find that local governments in California do not have much discretion in setting 
effluent limits (Water Education Foundation, 2013). In general, the institutional framework that 
states adopt in implementing stormwater policies affects the outcomes of these policies.  
2.2 Horizontal Fragmentation of Stormwater Management 
2.2.1 Local Government Competition 
The relationships of local governments with each other can be a mixture of competition 
and joint action. Local governments in the United States are characterized by fragmentation. In 
other words, each local unit has independent authority over its geographical boundaries. In 
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addition, each local unit is responsible for providing services to citizens and has the authority to 
impose a property tax. Thus, Tiebout (1956) explains that local governments can be seen as firms 
competing in a quasi-market providing public services to residents. According to Tiebout (1956), 
there are two reasons why local governments should compete. The first reason is people are 
seeking allocative efficiency—people get what they want, given what they want to pay. For 
example, if I pay a certain amount of property tax, I expect to receive a certain service quality. 
Therefore, people will sort themselves across local units to find the unit that approximates their 
preferences for the public good. The second reason relates to the possibility for competition to 
raise the efficiency of local units as a result of a competition to attract population, a process 
thought to work like the invisible hand in the market. In other words, the competition will create 
a diversity of choices for the consumer and will increase pressure on local units to find effective 
alternatives to compete in this market. This insight, in turn, leads to a discussion about how 
competition between local governments has occurred. According to Ostrom, Tiebout, and 
Warren (1961), local units compete by providing services commensurate with the taxes they 
impose. In other words, local units compete by providing a basket of services that targets 
residents’ preferences in order to attract them. In addition, the availability to access information 
about other local units will increase pressure to offer a level of service similar to that offered by 
other local units.  
This competitive public service economy view is built on a number of assumptions, 
including that “individuals are costlessly mobile and have heterogeneous preferences; individuals 
know tax and services of all local units; there are a large number of local units; employment does 
not affect individual residential choice; there are no inter-jurisdictional externalities; every 
jurisdiction has a (known) optimal size where the average cost of services provided is 
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minimized; jurisdictions below their optimal size seek to attract new residents” (Millimet, 2014, 
p. 1673). To put this in perspective, the process of people moving from one place to another is, in 
fact, costly; consequently, the inability to afford the cost of moving is one of the reasons for not 
moving or for seeking an alternative. Similarly, individuals cannot be aware of all the available 
options as they sort their options according to their preferences. Similarly, local units cannot 
know all individual options or always arrange services in accordance with their preferences. 
Importantly, a single decision from a local unit can have negative externalities for other units. 
For example, building a shopping center in city A can cause traffic congestion in city B. 
Therefore, Brennan and Buchanun (1980) argued that the only thing that local units can compete 
with is the property tax prices and that all other services are equal in their impact on the 
residents’ decision (as cited in Oates, 1985). In other words, local units can compete not by 
providing a basket of services but rather by reducing property taxes. 
Regardless, local unit competition can lead to a wider range of positive and negative 
outcomes. Among the positive ones, competition creates a multiplicity of options for citizens, 
which is consistent with democratic principles. On the other hand, competition via lowering tax 
rates will decrease the quality of services provided by government units. The reason is that the 
local unit will tend to reduce spending on services to make up for the shortfall in tax revenue 
when spending is reduced (Miller & Cox, 2015). Further, service competition will reduce the 
efficiency (cost per unit) of services at the regional level since there will be a duplication of 
services across jurisdictions. One of the most important consequences of competition between 
local governments is the creation of collective action problems at the horizontal level. According 
to Feiock (2013), one government’s decision regarding a specific function can affect other 
governments’ functions. In other words, local governments do not operate in an independent 
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world such that their decisions do not impact other government units; instead, any decision by a 
local government will impact other governments. In addition, local governments’ pursuit of 
individual gains without finding a way to integrate decisions with other local governments will 
result in a collectively inefficient outcome (Feiock, 2013). Therefore, local governments often 
find themselves in need of working collectively to reduce the negative externalities that may spill 
over across jurisdiction boundaries. 
2.2.2 Local Government Collaboration  
The notion of local government collective work has received a number of definitions in 
the research literature (see Table 2.1). By tracing the components of these definitions, one can 
observe a set of common elements among them. The first element in common among the 
definitions is “process,” which means collaboration in performing a series of operations on 
something to change or maintain it. The second element of the definition is “multi-
organizational,” which indicates that collaboration includes a relationship that brings together a 
number of actors. The third common element is “solving,” which indicates that the goal of the 
collaboration process is to solve some problem. The last common element among the definitions 
is “not single,” which indicates that the problem in question cannot be solved by a single actor 
independently of the rest of the actors. Thus, all these definitions suggest the same meaning: 
collaboration is an operation conducted by multiple actors to solve a problem that is unsolvable 
by a single independent actor. 





“Collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multi-organizational arrangements to solve problems 
that cannot be solved or easily solved by single organizations. Collaborative means 
to co-labor, to achieve common goals, often working across boundaries and in 
multi-sector and multi-actor relationships. Collaboration is based on the value of 
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Author(s) Definition 
reciprocity. Collaborative public management may include participatory 
governance: the active involvement of citizens in government decision-making” 
(p.3). 
McGuire (2006) 
"Collaborative public management is a concept that describes the process of 
facilitating and operating in multiorganizational arrangements in order to remedy 
problems that cannot be solved — or solved easily — by single organizations” (p. 
33). 
Gray (1989, as 
cited in Guo and 
Acar, 2005, p. 
342). 
Collaboration is a “process through which parties who see different aspects of a 
problem can constructively explore their differences and search for solutions that go 
beyond their own limited visions of what is possible” (p. 5). 
Sink (1998, as 
cited in Gazley 
2008) 
A “process by which organizations with a stake in a problem seek a mutually 
determined solution [by pursuing] objectives they could not achieve working alone” 
(p. 118).  
 
Nevertheless, the definitions point to the complexity of the concept of collaboration in 
several ways. First, the definitions do not specify the types of operations included within the 
scope of collaboration. Second, the definitions do not specify the actors that we can consider to 
be part of the collaboration process. Similarly, these definitions do not define the time frame in 
which the collaboration processes begin, endure, or end, suggesting that collaboration might be 
eternal. Finally, these definitions indicate that the problem of concern must be unsolvable by 
individuals; this, in turn, raises the question of the degree of vulnerability to or influence by the 
problem for the actors involved in the collaboration process. 
One of the explanations given for the motives of local governments for collaboration 
comes from resource dependency theory (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978; Guo & Acar, 2005; O’Leary 
et al., 2009). This perspective argues that the decision for an organization to enter into a 
collaborative relationship stems from its strategic decisions regarding its resources.  These 
decisions are occasioned by the fact that there is a mutual need among organizations to exchange 
resources for continuity and survival. In addition, cooperation in this regard may aim to increase 
certain resources or reduce competition. The second type of explanation for collaboration 
37 
relationships stems from exchange theories. From the transaction cost theory perspective, the 
pressure that local units face to reduce costs and increase performance quality makes them look 
for alternatives to achieve this; thus, they enter into collaborative relationships for mutual gain 
(O’Leary et al., 2009). 
Nevertheless, the primary goal of the collaboration relationship from the transaction cost 
perspective is to minimize an organization’s transaction cost (the cost of negotiation, 
information, monitoring, etc.) (Guo & Acar, 2005). Another interpretation of collaborative 
relationships depends on the institutional framework of which the actor is a part. According to 
Guo and Acar (2005), actors need to demonstrate conformity to the norms and social 
expectations of the institutional environment; thus, they establish linkages or exchanges with 
other actors to meet the necessary requirements. There are two kinds of effects of the 
institutional framework on the actors’ decision to collaborate: those arising from social and from 
industry norms. At the social level, actors need to demonstrate their trustworthiness to other 
actors to receive a joint grant. At the industry level, industry institutional norms may push 
members to enter into collaborative relationships assuming that the sense of responsibility 
toward professional norms will lead managers to seek to form collaborative relationships with 
their peers in the same profession (O’Leary et al., 2009). Finally, the collaboration between local 
governments takes a number of forms, which have received a range of characterization and use 
description in the literature. O’Leary et al. (2009) indicate there is no specific way to link a 
collaboration form to a specific theoretical explanation of collaboration. For example, 
contracting between local governments may be considered a privatization tool (O’Leary et al., 
2009), a formal collaboration tool (Guo & Acar, 2005), or a cooperation tool as in Feiock's 
(2013) institutional collective action framework (ICA). 
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2.2.3 The Role of Federal and State Governments at Horizontal Level 
Yi, Suo, Shen, Zhang, Ramaswami, and Feiock (2018) argued that federal and state 
governments, directly and indirectly, influence cooperation between local units. The direct 
impact by the federal government occurs through the attachment of cooperation requirements 
between local units to obtain federal funding. The direct impact on state governments occurs 
through the enactment of legislation requiring local governments to act collectively or develop 
collective action. One of the best-known examples of direct intervention by the state government 
in cooperative relations between government units can be found in Iowa, which established an 
institutional framework for registering contracts between local units; thus, the state contributed 
to reducing the risks associated with enforcing contracts, which reduced opportunistic behaviors 
in carrying out the contracts (Thurmaier, 2005). Federal and state governments indirectly affect 
cooperative relationships between local units through support for professional meetings and 
specialized conferences. According to Yi et al. (2018), the Federal Environmental Protection 
Agency regularly holds seminars and courses between local unit managers; this enhances the 
formation of professional networks, contributing to the forming of a collaboration between local 
units. 
2.2.4 Burdens of Stormwater Regulation at the Horizontal Level 
With the delegation of the stormwater management program implementation 
responsibility from the federal government to states and from the states to local governments, 
local governments have found themselves burdened by this responsibility in two ways: bearing 
the cost of implementation and avoiding the negative externalities of non-compliance by other 
local governments. According to Copeland (2006), deficient funding is a major challenge in 
implementing NPDES permits since the 1987 law did not specify adequate funding for 
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implementation. Despite the USAPA estimates that in 1994 the annual cost of permit compliance 
was between “$750 million and $1.1 billion a year,” there are no precise estimates of the cost in 
the report data (2006). Moreover, the Clean Watersheds Needs Survey indicated that stormwater 
management programs in the states cost approximately twenty billion dollars (USEPA, 2016). 
For example, the state of Texas alone has stated that it needed $3 billion to manage stormwater 
in the state (USEPA, 2016). Thus, the current solutions represent a legislative burden for local 
governments subjected to stormwater permits (MS4 permits). Local governments subject to the 
MS4 stormwater permits regulations must secure funds to comply with the MS4 requirements. 
On the other hand, the EPA and its counterparts in the states devote resources to ensuring 
compliance and violation fines, as occurs in Texas (TCEQ, 2013).  
The other burden involved in implementing current solutions (involving MS4 permits) is 
the negative externalities of non-compliance. First, compliance with the MS4 regulation requires 
cooperation between the subjected local governments, given the fact that a drainage system could 
go through multiple cities. According to Minan (2005), the MS4 faces a legal liability dilemma 
because it requires a complete drainage system that goes from the stormwater collection point to 
a discharge point; thus, the discharge may go through multiple cities, which raises concerns 
about who is liable for the pollution as well as about the economic cost associated with 
implementing the MS4 requirements. Besides the problem of liability, failure to comply with the 
existing laws leads to the emergence of a stormwater collective action problem for all the actors 
in the region. This, in turn, may lead to flooding or to the transfer of harmful waste from the 
source to the neighboring governments.  
Both the USEPA and the states have recognized the importance of cooperation between 
local units to achieve the goals of stormwater management programs. For example, the USEPA 
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allows joint permits to be issued for a number of local governments. This type of permit includes 
a comprehensive plan for all members participating in the permit. At the state level, we find that 
some permits assign coordination between local governments to regional organizations. For 
example, in California, regional organizations are relied on to enforce stormwater permit 
requirements. On the other hand, other regional actors (such as the North Central Texas Council 
of Governments) urge local governments to cooperate to meet legislative requirements (Storm 
Water Cooperative Agreement Handbook, 2009). 
2.3 A Multilevel Governance Framework to Understanding Fragmentation in the 
Implementation of Stormwater Policies 
 
As previously mentioned, institutional arrangements at the vertical level affect the policy 
outcomes on the one hand; On the other hand, the factors that lead to cooperation between local 
governments at the horizontal level must be considered to ensure access to the policy outcomes. 
More specifically, national or state governments cannot effectively implement policies without 
framing their relationship with local governments who act as agents of policy enforcement on the 
ground (OECD, 2010). On the other hand, local governments cannot effectively implement the 
policies imposed on them independently of other governments at the horizontal level (OECD, 
2010). Thus, there is always a need for a multilevel governance framework to understand the 
extent of the effectiveness of the institutional framework followed by the higher government 
within the vertical level in achieving public policy objectives on the one hand, and on the other 
hand, knowing the reasons that motivate local governments to cooperate at the horizontal level. 
In other words, to achieve effectiveness in implementing public policies, two questions must be 
discussed: How does the adopted institutional framework to deal with vertical fragmentation 
affect policy outcomes? And what motivates the local governments to work together to meet the 
legislative burden resulting from implementing the policies imposed on them by the higher 
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governments? 
Some theories attempt to answer each of these questions, the most prominent of which is 
the local public economies and its polycentric approach vs. the race to the bottom theory on the 
vertical institutional fragmentation side and transaction costs on the horizontal institutional 
fragmentation side. The theory of local public economies argued that regulating environmental 
pollution must be done through a polycentric approach (Cowie and Borrett, 2005). The 
polycentric approach is widely used to explain the vertical institutional fragmentation of 
implementing environmental policies (Zelli, 2015; Homsy, Liu, & Warner, 2019). The 
polycentric approach is employed in the theory of local public economies, developed by Elinor 
Ostrom to categorize the institutional actions that aim to deal with the collective action problems 
into three levels (Cowie & Borrett, 2005). According to Cowie & Borrett (2005), the top 
(constitutional) level rules are set to constitute the "collective choice" of the actors at lower 
levels. At the intermediate (collective choice) level, the arrangements and decisions are made 
according to the rules established at the constitutional level. At lower (operational) levels, the 
decisions are implemented according to the arrangements and decisions made at the collective 
choice level. To put this into the environmental policies, both the Federal Environmental 
Protection Agency and its corresponding agencies in the states develop environmental legislation 
to face collective environmental problems, which can be seen as existing at the constitutional 
level. Consequently, local governments need to provide the appropriate framework to meet this 
legislation, corresponding to the collective choice level. In addition, the relevant departments of 
local governments implement these environmental decisions, which represent the operational 
levels. Although the polycentric approach contributes to understanding institutional 
fragmentation at the vertical level, the relationship between local governments at the horizontal 
42 
level must be considered to achieve the desired policy goals.  
The polycentric approach argues for giving local governments more power in the 
implementation process, i.e., supporting decentralization in implementing public policies. On the 
other hand, the race to the bottom theory argument is that states will adopt relaxed environmental 
legislation to compete with other states in attracting economic development; thus, states will 
adopt more decentralization institutional to enforce national environmental policies, giving them 
an advantage in their competition with other states (Konisky, 2007). In other words, the states 
will give a high degree of discretion to local governments to meet the legal requirements 
associated with federal environmental legislation to attract economic development. Therefore, at 
the vertical institutional fragmentation, there is a conflict between the impact of centralization 
and decentralization on the outcomes of public policies. In other words, the conflict revolves 
around the effectiveness of concentrating the authority of policy implementation in the hand of 
one government versus dividing the authority of policy implementation on several governments 
at different levels of government. The adopted institutional arrangement of implement public 
policies at the vertical level affects policy outcomes. 
The horizontal institutional fragmentation side, transaction costs theory, is widely used 
by researchers to investigate why local governments cooperate (Andrew, 2009). In this respect, 
arrangements made by states to deal with the uncertainty problems associated with solving 
collective action problems impose costs on local governments, which in turn will seek to into 
contractual relationships for compliance that minimize the transaction costs of contracting 
(Andrew, 2009). During the nineties, there was great pressure coming for the New Public 
Management reforms on the government to reduce costs by producing services through external 
contracting (Milward & Editor, 1996). In light of this cost-cutting pressure, governments 
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decisions regarding the internal production of the service or contracting it out (while preserving 
ownership and liability associated with the service) were linked to a number of transaction costs 
risks factors that include service-specific characteristics, the degree of competition, goal 
incongruence of the contracting parties (Brown & Potoski, 2003). The degree of competition 
between the service vendors represents an important transaction costs risk factor. According to 
Brown and Potoski (2003), the contracting process becomes more efficient if there are a 
sufficient number of competing service providers because the sufficient number of competitors 
contributes to revealing information about the real price of the service in addition to reducing the 
cost of monitoring, as the service providers will be under threat of losing the contract in favor of 
other providers in the next contracting round if they do not adhere to the quality of 
implementation. According to Morgan, Hirlinger, and England (1988) and Morgan and Hirlinger 
(1991), the geographic location of the local government impact their ability to have a sufficient 
number of suppliers—that is, the existence of a competitive market for the service; thus, the 
location of local governments within Standard Metropolitan Area increases the opportunities for 
contracting out to provide stormwater management service. On the other side, LeRoux and Carr 
(2007) found that the increase in the number of neighbors negatively affects the decision to join 
the interlocal agreement, which contradicts the assumption regarding the impact of the degree of 
competition on transaction costs. Therefore, it can be said that the decision on contractual 
relationships may be limited to whether the impact of the geographical location of the local 
government is positive or negative about joining contractual relations for the implementation of 
the service. 
As explained in the previous section, implementing the current policy solutions (MS4 
permit) to stormwater issues require joint action of governments at different levels (federal, state, 
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local governments) and between units at the same level (federal-federal, state-state, local 
government-local government). In addition, understanding the issue of fragmentation in the 
implementation of stormwater management policies can be done by looking at the relationship 
between the level of centralization in the institutional framework adopted by the states to 
implement the policy and the policy outcomes, as well as by looking at the reasons that can 
affect the decision of local governments to enter into cooperative relationships to meet the 
legislative burdens resulting from the requirements of implementing stormwater management 
policies. On the one hand, the two solutions available to deal with vertical fragmentation in 
implementing public policies are either adopting centralized or decentralized institutional 
arrangements (Lyons and Lowery, 1989). Accordingly, the impact of choosing any of these 
institutional arrangements on public policy outcomes must be recognized. On the other hand, 
local governments that suffer from meeting the regulatory burdens imposed on them by the 
federal and state governments need to work jointly to reduce the cost of compliance first and 
then reduce the negative effects of not like other governments. Combing an understanding of the 
impact of the institutional arrangements chosen by state governments to implement stormwater 
management policies at the vertical level with an understanding of the reasons why local 
governments enter into cooperative relationships at the horizontal level to meet the regulatory 
burdens imposed on them by federal/state governments presents a multilevel governance 
framework to understanding fragmentation in the implementation of stormwater policies since it 
studies the vertical links between local and state governments and its impact on water quality, as 
well as the relationship between local governments on the regional level. This dissertation seeks 
to empirically test the proposed framework via carrying out two empirical studies. 
The first paper focuses on the institutional arrangement used by states to implement 
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stormwater management policies. The NPDES gives the states the freedom to adopt the 
institutional arrangement if the states choose to hold the authority over the program; otherwise, 
the USAPA will adopt the institutional arrangement for implementing the program. Building on 
race to the bottom literature, the impact of the institutional arrangements centralization on the 
state water quality is examined. The paper uses a qualitative approach to compare and evaluate 
the variation in the state institutional arrangement in a sample of four case studies that include 
California, Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota. This study analyzes the state stormwater institutional 
arrangement on five dimensions: formalism, coercion, education, prioritization, and 
accommodation. Since stormwater quality is changeable over time, the study uses five years 
(2013-2018) permitting cycle to assess the stormwater quality status in sample case studies based 
on reports issued by these states during the permit period.  
The second paper focuses on the local government's decision to join ILA to comply with 
federal/state stormwater management policies. Although regional cooperation is not part of the 
stormwater regulations, the USAPA encourages regional cooperation, and some states 
incorporated it into their institutional arrangement. Building on the Transaction costs framework, 
the paper examines the context of cooperation to comply with federal/state stormwater 
management policies. The paper uses a cross-sectional design to analyze a case study, and the 
unit of analysis is subjected cities. The case study consists of 119 cities subjected to the NPDES 
MS4 requirements in northern Texas during 2017. The dependent variable in this paper is the 
membership of the regional ILA, and the independent variables are the number of neighboring 
cities and population density. Community wealth, public works spending, stormwater fee, 
government type, and the percent of the population over 65 is used as control variables. Logistic 
regression is used for data analysis. 
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CHAPTER 3 
ESSAY 1: STORMWATER QUALITY AT THE STATE LEVEL 
3.1 Introduction 
Public policy implementation fragmentation at the vertical level is manifested through the 
transfer of powers of implementation between different levels of government. In addition, the 
process of delegating authority to implement public policy, especially environmental policy, has 
received attention from researchers as it constitutes an aspect of a new era in inter-governmental 
relations. The devolution of responsibility for environmental policies from one tier of 
government to another has led researchers to investigate the potential of this process to affect 
public policy performance and its ability to promote the achievement of those policy goals. 
According to Cutter and DeShazo (2007), the phase of devolution of authority to implement 
environmental policies begins by delegating the authority from the federal government to the 
fifty state governments; the states, in turn, transfer this authority to another series of institutional 
arrangements within in its activity domain before the implementation process ends to a local 
authority that implements its environmental policy within its local activity domain or 
jurisdiction. The devolution of environmental policies creates a movement known as the “race to 
the bottom,” and the related theory argues that states will adopt relaxed environmental legislation 
to compete with other states in attracting economic development (Konisky, 2007). In other 
words, the states will give a high degree of discretion to local governments to meet the legal 
requirements associated with federal environmental legislation to attract economic development.  
In the area of water policies, we find a discrepancy in the institutional frameworks that 
states choose to implement federal water policies. The diversity between institutional 
frameworks adopted by states to implement water policies extends over a spectrum of 
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centralization to decentralized that can be explained by each state’s self-policy goals, which may 
include increasing/decreasing the policy requirements or free-riding on the efforts of other states 
(Chang, Sigman, & Traub, 2014; Woods, 2005; Sigman, 2005). Therefore, this paper aims to 
investigate the impact of the states' institutional arrangements on environmental policy outputs 
by focusing on the issue of stormwater. Specifically, this paper investigates the effects of 
variations in the institutional arrangements that states have adapted to implement federal policies 
to reduce water pollution from stormwater. The paper seeks an answer to the following question: 
How do the institutional arrangements adopted to implement stormwater policies 
influence variation in stormwater quality at the state level? 
 
The NPDES gives the states the freedom to adopt institutional arrangements if the states 
choose to hold authority over the program; otherwise, the USAPA will determine the 
institutional arrangements for implementing the program. However, the stormwater literature has 
largely overlooked the importance of the impact of the types of state institutional structures on 
stormwater quality and the reduction of stormwater pollution. Such literature has been either 
technical studies based on engineering and environmental work that has omitted the variation in 
the institutional arrangements among states or studies focusing on the role of states based on 
specific case studies with the absence of a holistic depiction of the impact of institutional 
frameworks on the problem. Therefore, this paper contributes to bridging the gap in our 
understanding of the impact of the institutional frameworks adopted by the states to implement 
environmental policy through empirically evaluating the role of the institutional arrangements 
(as represented in the States general MS4 permits) on the policy output (i.e., reducing the level of 
stormwater pollution). In addition, the paper provides a full picture of the impact of the 
institutional framework in the states on policy outputs by including four case studies: California, 
Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota. This study also enables public policymakers in the states to 
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compare the performance of their institutional frameworks with other institutional frameworks; 
in turn, this will help them to improve their choices about dealing with stormwater or other 
environmental issues. Finally, the paper results assist professionals in exploring the institutional 
frameworks in which they work within their states, which should help them increase their 
performance and improve their work outcomes.  
The literature on stormwater quality relevant to the proposed research question is 
discussed in the next section. In addition, the paper presents the proposed theoretical framework 
to explain the role of the institutional arrangements in the states for the issue of stormwater 
quality. The paper then discusses the research methodology for investigating the research 
question; this is followed by a discussion and conclusion on the study results.  
3.2 Literature Review 
There are two trends in the literature on the consequences of states’ assuming 
environmental program enforcement authority, particularly in the area of stormwater 
management policies. The first trend is the technical studies, which are primarily in the 
engineering and environmental disciplines. According to Moore, Rodak, Ahmed, and Vogel 
(2018), “Over 50 papers were published in 2017 regarding the physical, chemical and biological 
characteristics of stormwater and how these characteristics are influenced by land use and other 
environmental factors” (p. 1822). In other words, most of the literature on stormwater published 
during the year under review revolved around the technical (biological and physical) 
characteristics associated with stormwater management. Although technical studies aimed at 
improving the performance measures included plans for best management practices (BMPs—the 
required component of the MS4 permits for local governments), they have contributed to the 
complexity of these plans because the techniques used to manage stormwater are constantly 
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changing (Comstock et al., 2012). Nevertheless, the UNEPA carried out two main projects to 
measure rainwater quality. The first effort, the National Urban Runoff Program (NURP), was 
concluded in 1983; it aimed to measure the quality of stormwater based on the level of seven 
types of pollutants: the “total suspended solids (TSS), 5-day biological oxygen demand (BOD5), 
chemical oxygen demand (COD), total phosphorus (TP), total Kjeldahl nitrogen (TKN), nitrite 
plus nitrate (NO2+NO3), total copper (Cu), total lead (Pb), and total zinc (Zn)” (National 
Research Council, 2008, p. 215). 
Similarly, the National Stormwater Quality Database (NPDES), begun in 2003, collects 
information about MS4 permit holders annually with regard to the quality of stormwater based 
on the seven types of pollutants that the NURP identified (Pitt, Maestre, & Clary, 2018). 
According to the National Research Council report (2008), the NPDES is comprehensive about 
stormwater quality. Still, there is great diversity in the standards used by MS4 permit holders for 
enforcement of the regulations. In other words, technical studies and technical data generally do 
not consider the institutional framework within which stormwater management is implemented. 
The other type of literature that studies the consequences of states adopting stormwater 
management policies takes the form of case studies. For example, Rabe (1995) studied the 
permitting process in Minnesota and New Jersey and concluded that these states are limited in 
their permitting processes. Other researchers have investigated the outcomes of the application of 
stormwater management policies by states. For instance, Santhi, Srinivasan, Arnold, and 
Williams (2006) investigated the water quality management practices implemented in Texas. 
They found that the water quality management practices implemented successfully reduced 
pollution levels (up to 99%), in line with the limits set in state Total Maximum Daily Load 
standards. Although these studies indicate that there have been positive results in achieving 
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stormwater management policies in some states, it is impossible to generalize the results without 
considering the differences in the institutional frameworks between the states. 
Therefore, two main gaps remain in the research literature on the states’ role in achieving 
federal stormwater management policy goals. The first gap is centered around data on states’ 
efforts to achieve the federal stormwater management policy goals. No correlation has been 
identified between these achievements and the institutional frameworks of the states. The second 
gap revolves around the limited generalization of studies that use the outputs of some states in 
case studies without considering institutional differences among states in implementing 
stormwater management policies. In this context, the current study fills these gaps by examining 
the impact of the state’s type of institutional framework on achieving the goals of stormwater 
management policies. Specifically, this essay uses the type of institutional framework for 
implementing the MS4 permits adopted in each state to explain its performance in reducing the 
level of pollution in stormwater, in its effort to fulfill the goal of the Clean Water Act, aims to 
preserve the quality of water and avoid pollution. 
3.3 The Proposed Theoretical Framework 
The theory of local public economies developed by Elinor Ostrom and her colleagues 
looks at the process of dealing with environmental problems resulting from human diffusion 
through the principle of externalities. This approach sees regulatory activity as an effective 
means for internalizing the external costs of environmental impacts resulting from market 
economic activities (Oates & Portney, 2003). For example, when industrial waste produced by a 
factory begins to harm the environment, a means must be found to deal with the externalities left 
by this activity. According to Oates and Portney (2003), public economies theory argues that the 
ideal way to deal with the collective action problems is either by imposing taxes equal to the 
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social harm resulting from pollution activities or by imposing a permit system that determines a 
balanced proportion of economic efficiency and social harm.  Searching for the appropriate 
balance between economic efficiency and social impact depends on knowing the economic and 
social costs associated with economic activity. Therefore, the theory of local public economies 
argues that regulation of the environmental pollution must be done in three levels: the 
constitutional level, where the rules are set to constitute the "collective choice" of the actors at 
lower levels; the collective choice level, where the arrangements and decisions are made 
regarding implementing the constitutional choice; and the operational levels, where the decisions 
are implemented in accordance with the arrangements and decisions that were made at the 
collective choice level (Cowie & Borrett, 2005). The constitutional choice establishes a 
standardized methodology that ensures that everyone shares the same outcomes within this 
arrangement. In addition, the collective choice implies that every actor would tailor 
constitutional requirements according to their needs by developing the necessary legislation, 
designing administrative institutions, and formulating institutional arrangements to achieve the 
constitutional goals. At the operational levels, the actors responsible for the implementation 
process formulate operation options to achieve their own goals within their activity domain. At 
the same time, they comply with the higher-level requirements.  
One of the most prominent assumptions of this theory is that collective choices determine 
the end product of the policy. However, this assumption raises controversy about the 
centralization or decentralization of the institutional arrangement selected at the collective choice 
level. According to Oates and Portney (2003), centralization or decentralization of the 
institutional arrangements for implementing environmental policies are two sides of the same 
coin. On the one hand, from the decentralization point of view, decision-making should be 
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carried out by actors who implement policies within their activity domains because the cost and 
benefit are confined within their jurisdiction boundaries. On the other hand, from the 
centralization point of view, the decision-making should be unified across all jurisdictions to 
ensure policy goals and reduce opportunistic behaviors. Oates and Portney (2003) stated that the 
race to the bottom literature mixes these two arguments. The main argument is that states will 
adopt relaxed environmental legislation to compete with other states in attracting economic 
development; thus, states will opt for more institutional decentralization in enforcing national 
environmental policies, giving them an advantage in their competition with other states 
(Konisky, 2007). In other words, the states will give a high degree of discretion to local 
governments to meet the legal requirements associated with federal environmental legislation in 
order to attract economic development.  
However, the relationship between centralization and decentralization and the impact on 
environmental policy outputs remains controversial.  For example, Sigman (2005) studied the 
free-riding behaviors of states benefiting from the same water resources and found these 
behaviors were primary in the implementation of the CWA. The study included water quality 
data collected from 1973-1995 in 618 monitoring stations across all the states. Sigman (2005) 
argued that the discretion in implementation and enforcement of standards of the CWA allows 
states to engage in opportunistic behavior by lowering the level of environmental standards in 
their boundaries if the state upstream adopts higher standards. The underlying logic of such 
opportunistic behavior is that the benefits of the higher standards at the upstream state would 
extend to the downstream state; thus, the downstream state would not need to adopt higher 
standers.  According to Sigman (2005), the study found evidence of such free-rider behaviors but 
indicated the results should not outweigh consideration of the benefits of decentralization. 
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Indeed, the benefits of decentralization in meeting local needs may outweigh the opportunistic 
behaviors of some states. 
Similarly, Huang, Santibanez-Gonzalez, and Song (2018) employed a game-theoretical 
model to study the effects of the exchange of information between the federal and state 
governments on the cost of implementing environmental standards, and they argued that the state 
would hide the true cost to be able to implement lower standards compared to other states. 
Huang, Santibanez-Gonzalez, and Song (2018) stated that their game-theoretical model results 
indicated that interstate spillover of pollution is greater under conditions of states’ control of the 
implementation process since they ignore the effect of their choices on the other states. In the 
same context, Millimet (2013) reviewed the empirical literature on the impact of decentralization 
on environmental policy outputs and concluded that “there is no empirical evidence to support 
the (intuitive) notion that subnational jurisdictions are better able to act on community 
preferences than the central government” (p. 1756). In other words, decentralization may not 
lead to the desired environmental results. 
Regarding environmental policies related to water quality management, we find that 
water quality is characterized as a local public good. According to Oates and Portney (2003), 
water quality or lack of quality is of concern to local consumers as they are the primary 
beneficiaries or are affected by any change in water quality. Moreover, the cost associated with 
any water quality management measures is affected by the size of the local units as small local 
governments cannot bear the high cost of technologies as compared to large local governments 
(Oates & Portney, 2003). Sigman (2014) also studied the impact of the decentralization of water 
policies by analyzing the change in the water quality of rivers from 1979-1999 in 47 countries. 
Sigman (2014) found that the results did not support the race to the bottom theory (regulatory 
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competition). Moreover, Sigman (2014) stated that the empirical evidence indicated 
decentralization does not increase overall pollution. Therefore, the debate between centralization 
and decentralization in water quality policies tends to favor the decentralized approach. 
Since stormwater is within the scope of water policies, I would argue that the institutional 
framework adopted by the state for stormwater management will influence the targeted outputs 
of stormwater management policies. In other words, the variation in stormwater quality can be 
explained in terms of the institutional framework followed by the states to implement public 
policies related to stormwater management. According to this view, it can be said that the 
disparities in the centralization and decentralization of the institutional frameworks followed in 
the states to implement constitutional policies related to stormwater management will affect the 
outcomes of these policies.  
3.4 Research Design 
To explore the variation in stormwater quality at the state level, a review of MS4 permit 
documents was conducted to determine the impact of institutional arrangement used by states to 
implement stormwater management policies (MS4 permits) on the quality of the state stormwater 
as reported by their 305(b)/303(d) impaired waters list. In other words, this study followed a 
qualitative approach to explore the relationship between the variation in the states’ institutional 
arrangements and their stormwater quality. According to Ospina, Esteve, and Lee (2018), in the 
field of public administration, “methodologically robust qualitative studies help explain 
phenomena of importance to PA” (p. 601). In other words, qualitative studies contribute to 
enhancing our understanding of the phenomena of interest in the study of public administration 
as long as they follow a robust methodological process. Mele et al. (2020) indicated that the 
robust reporting of qualitative studies within the public administration field should include a 
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rationale for using the methodological process and for the selection of sources of data and 
analytic strategies and should observe ethical practices. Therefore, the following section presents 
details of the study methodology according to the framework of robust qualitative studies within 
the public administration field. 
3.4.1 Data Description  
 Sample and Sample Selection 
This study explores four case studies that include California, Texas, Virginia, and 
Minnesota. According to Adler (2009b), institutional arrangements for managing water issues 
vary according to the state regions as eastern states have a unified form of institutional 
arrangements, western states have multiple forms of institutional arrangements, and the rest of 
the states take the form of a mixture between the two. The four states comprising the sample for 
this study represent the rest of the states in their respective regions (note that this study divides 
the U.S. map into four regions instead of other traditional divisions, which can be found in other 
studies). The selected states share similar regional weather conditions with their neighboring 
states and are affected by similar externalities. In addition, each of these states contains internal 
variation in terms of the urbanization phase, which is related to stormwater quality. Finally, the 
states included in the sample vary in terms of their legislative frameworks, making them suitable 
for the analysis. 
 Data Generation 
According to USEPA (n.d.), 47 states have assumed the authority to issue MS4 permits, 
and the agency manages the permit in three states: Massachusetts, New Hampshire, and New 
Mexico. The process of assuming the authority to issue permits includes the submitting of a 
proposal by the state to the USEPA, which in turn reviews the proposal; thus, if the USEPA 
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approves the proposed permit, the permit is granted to the state for a five-year period (USEPA, 
n.d.). However, not all states have implemented the issuance of permits at the same time. This, in 
turn, affected the permit cycle. For example, we may find some states have more than one cycle 
in stormwater permits—for one MS4 permit, the cycle is five years—and others have only one 
single cycle. In addition, the USEPA employs a five-year window for assessing whether permits 
meet the requirements of the CWA regardless of the cycle and the date of the permit (USEPA, 
n.d.). Therefore, this study employs a similar concept regarding the collection of data about the 
state’s institutional arrangements, which means that the study selects a permit and performance 
report for review within a single historical cycle.  
3.4.2 Data Sources and Analysis 
 Data Sources 
The first source of the data is the general MS4 permits issued by the states during the 
cycle 2013 to 2018 (see Table 4.1). The reason for choosing this period is that data related to 
stormwater quality are limited, and states have different permit cycles. Therefore, this time 
window makes it possible to include all the data that result from the variation of the state permit 
cycles. The sampling period was from 2013 to 2018, and the sample included the latest active 
general MS4 permit in each state during the sampling period. According to Ospina, Esteve, and 
Lee (2018), analysis of government policy documents makes it possible to “identify mechanisms 
that could explain a surprising situation or outcome” (p. 601). In other words, policy documents 
can show the mechanisms that have been put in place to achieve the desired outcomes of the 
policy. 
Purdy (2012) used policy documents and other resources to study power mechanisms 
between federal, states, and other stakeholders in the process of redesigning the rules for 
57 
hydroelectric licensing. Moreover, Keller and Cavallaro (2008) followed a similar method to 
study the variations in state government guidelines on implementing the waterbody 303(d) listing 
law (the states’ listing of the impaired and threatened waters). In a study of stormwater, Grigg 
(2013) used a similar method to study the variation in financing stormwater management in over 
twenty MS4 cities in several states. Therefore, the use of policy documents to explain outcomes 
is well-rooted in the existing literature. 
Table 3.1: The Sample States and Their General MS4 Permits for Review 
State General MS4 Permits Authorization Cycle Starter 
California CAS000004 2013 
Texas TXR040000 2013 
Virginia  9VAC25-890-40 2013 
Minnesota MNR040000 2013 
 
The second data source is the reports from each state of their 305(b)/303(d) impaired 
waters lists. According to the USEPA (n.d.), in 1992, Part 130.7 was added to the Clean Water 
Act to require states to carry three new tasks: identifying waters that require a plan for restoring 
(total maximum daily load—TMDLs), determining the sources of pollution, and updating the 
impaired waters list every two years. Despite laws requiring the federal government to review 
and approve the list, states are responsible for determining sites and deciding how to measure 
water quality. Therefore, each state takes a certain approach to comply with these legislative 
requirements. For example, in California, the State Water Resources Control Board determines 
reporting periods for the nine regional boards; thus, in a cycle, water quality data are included for 
only some of the regional boards, and the next cycle would include data from other regions. 
Nevertheless, not all states identify sources of pollution. For example, California, Texas, and 
Virginia measure stormwater from urban areas for water quality pollutants. On the other hand, 
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the state of Minnesota indicates only the chemical components that are found in the analysis 
samples, which makes it difficult to determine the source of the chemicals. Considering these 
differences, this study reviews two different reports for each state (see Table 4.2). In some cases, 
the study compares the report results for the pre-permit adoption period with those for the post-
permit adoption period. In other cases, it compares an early period of permit adoption with a later 
period of the permit adoption. The reason for this division is that states vary in their reporting 
periods. 
Table 3.2: The Sample States and Their 305(b)/303(d) Impaired Waters Listing for Review 




2014 and 2016 California 
Integrated Report Clean Water 





Integrated Report 2016-2018 
Texas 
2014 Texas Integrated Report 
of Surface Water Quality for 
the Clean Water Act Sections 
305(b) and 303(d) 
2012-2014 
2018 Texas 
Integrated Report of 
Surface Water 
Quality for the Clean 
Water Act Sections 
305(b) and 303(d) 
2016-2018 
Virginia  
Virginia Water Quality 
Assessment 305(b)/303(d) 













2016 - 2017 
 
 Data Analysis 
To explore how the institutional arrangements are made to enforce stormwater 
management policies in the states, this study analyzes stormwater permits along five dimensions 
that include permit formalism, coercion, education, prioritization, and accommodation (see Table 
4.3). 
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Table 3.3: Evaluation and Comparison Dimensions 




The emphasis State Government 
puts on detailing rigid legal 
requirements for the permittees 
(MS4 cities) regarding 
implementing the MS4 permit 
How detailed is the MS4 
permit regarding the 
implementation process? 
Limiting the permittees’ 
implementation discretion 
via detailed guidelines 
outlining the actions that 
the permittees should take 
specifically for each 
requirement 
Giving the permittees some 
discretion over the 
implementation via general 
directives without a detailed 
definition of the actions 
Coercion 
The emphasis a State Government 
puts on issuing threats and 
sanctions during the 
implementation of the MS4 permit 
by the permittees (MS4 cities) 
How coercion is the 
MS4 permit regarding 
the falling to meet the 
requirements? 
Including a breakdown of 
the sanctions that are 
diverse in size and/or type 
Including limited sanctions 
that are less diverse in size 
and/or type 
Educational 
The emphasis a State Government 
puts on educating the permittees 
(MS4 cities) regarding 
implementing the MS4 permit 
How does the MS4 
permit address the 
educational needs of the 
permittees (MS4 cities)? 
Including educational 
requirements that 
permittees must meet  
Including voluntary 
educational resources that 
permittees can utilize 
Prioritization 
The emphasis a State Government 
puts on considering contextual 
constraints during the 
implementation of the MS4 permit 
by the permittees (MS4 cities) 
How does the MS4 
permit address the 
contextual differences 
between the permittees 
(MS4 cities)? 
Specifying the contextual 
constraints that can require 
a separate course of action 
and the required action in 
such events 
Leaving the contextual 
constraints to the 
permittees’ discretion 
Accommodation 
The extent to which a State 
Government emphasizes taking 
opinions of other stakeholders into 
account during the implementation 
of the MS4 permit by the 
permittees (MS4 cities) 
How does the MS4 




involved in the 
implementation process? 
Specifying the permittee 
action regarding the 
relationship with 
stakeholders within their 
domain and their roles in 
the implementation 
process.  
Presenting a voluntary 
course of action regarding 
the permittee relationship 
with stakeholders within 
their domain and their roles 
in the implantation process 
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Building on de Boer’s (2019) work regarding frontline policy enforcement, this study uses the 
following analytical questions to guide the evaluation and comparison of the cases: 
1- How detailed is the MS4 permit regarding the implementation process? 
2- How coercive is the MS4 permit when there is a failure to meet the requirements? 
3- How does the MS4 permit address the educational needs of the permittees (MS4 
cities)? 
4- How does the MS4 permit address the contextual differences between the permittees 
(MS4 cities)? 
5- How does the MS4 permit address the cooperation and collaboration between the 
stakeholders involved in the implementation process? 
According to Etienne (2015), any regulatory regime would include enforcement elements 
that ensure the desired outcome. Nevertheless, Carter (2017) stated that “regulatory approaches 
can be observed and measured through regulatory behaviors and practices” (p. 727). The 
regulatory behaviors include “tools or tactics used by an agency to bring about regulatee 
compliance” (Carter, 2017, p. 727). Moreover, Carter (2017) indicated that the study of 
regulatory enforcement varies from focusing on the regulatory agency as a unit of analysis to 
focusing on the individual street-level bureaucrat as a unit of analysis on the other end. However, 
Carter (2017) argued that there is confusion concerning how to study the regulatory behaviors of 
the regulatory agencies in terms of their strategy and legislative approaches. Furthermore, de 
Boer (2019) stated that the literature on individual street-level bureaucrats' regulatory 
enforcement behaviors had identified five main dimensions to measure the relationship between 
the enforcers of legislation and the regulated entities. These dimensions include formalism as 
“the degree of rigidity in interactions that varies from informal conversations and rule-bound 
instances” (May & Winter, 2000, p. 147, as cited in de Boer, 2019, p. 382), coercion as “the 
willingness to issue threats that vary from a trusting inspector not issuing warnings, to a skeptical 
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threatening to report or to impose penalties for violations” (May & Winter, 2000, p. 147, as cited 
in de Boer, 2019, p. 382), educational highlighted as “focusing on informing and educating 
inspectees during interactions” (de Boer, 2019, p. 383), prioritization “concerned with placing 
more emphasis on contextual circumstances and being effective than on other elements—like 
informing inspectees” (Tummers et al., 2015, as cited in de Boer, 2019, p. 383), and 
accommodation, which emphasizes “the reconciliation of the demands of key stakeholders in 
regulatory enforcement” (Lo et al., 2009, p. 2710, as cited in de Boer, 2019, p. 383). Therefore, 
this paper has adopted these well-established dimensions to analyze how the state in each case 
study established its institutional arrangements to enforce stormwater regulation, given that the 
states, by assuming authority to implement the regulation, are responsible for enforcing the 
regulation via writing and issuing the MS4 permits.  
With regard to stormwater quality, this study tracks changes in the amount of pollution 
attributed to urban areas’ stormwater as the MS4 legislation aims to reduce this type of water 
pollution. As mentioned previously, every state of the study sample includes information on 
stormwater pollution except for Minnesota. Thus, the study uses the number of times the 
turbidity impact (the measure of relative clarity of a liquid) was determined on the sample water 
bodies for the state of Minnesota. According to Métadier and Bertrand (2012), the turbidity 
measure is one of the most common methods of determining the impact of stormwater pollution. 
Therefore, the turbidity impact deduction in the case of Minnesota is used to represent the impact 
of stormwater pollution in the state’s water bodies. 
3.4.3 Ethical Considerations 
Regarding ethical practices, Mele et al. (2020) indicated that researchers should discuss 
the ethical frameworks they have adopted in qualitative studies. This study did not contain any 
62 
human element that required Institutional Review Boards. In addition, this study details all its 
procedures, which will facilitate replication by other researchers. As well, the analytic strategies 
of the study did not include any coding process but only analytical questions. Therefore, there is 
no risk to any parties or entities related to this study or any potential bias threat. 
3.5 Results and Discussion 
3.5.1 Results 
Based on the information in Table 4.4, it can be seen that the states that were included in 
the study sample differ along the five analysis dimensions. The arrangements in the states ranged 
from a highly centralized institutional arrangement for implementing stormwater regulation, as 
was the case with California, to a very decentralized institutional arrangement, as was the case 
with Texas. In addition, other states adopted a mixed institutional arrangement for implementing 
stormwater regulation that might in some cases tend toward being central, as was the case with 
Minnesota. In other states, arrangements tended to be less centralized, as was the case with 
Virginia. Each state institutional arrangement for implementing stormwater regulation is 
discussed in detail below. 
 California 
California was one of the first states to adopt legislation to deal with stormwater. In 1949, 
California passed the Dickey Water Pollution Act, which established the State Water Pollution 
Control Board (SWRCB) and nine regional boards to oversee and enforce the state’s pollution 
prevention and abatement program (Water Education Foundation, 2013). The SWRCB was 
responsible for enforcing the state’s anti-pollution program. In addition, California passed the 
Porter-Cologne Water Quality Control Act of 1969, which increased the power of the SWRCB in 
regard to pollution prevention.. 
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Table 3.4: States’ Institutional Arrangements for Implementing Stormwater Regulation 
Dimension California Texas Virginia Minnesota 
Formalism 
Uses numerical and quantifiable 
approaches for the specific stormwater 
controls or management measures with 
detailed guidelines outlining the actions 
that the permittees should take 
specifically for each requirement 
(CAS000004, 2013, sections: 
E.6.a.(ii)(h), E.9.c.(ii)(a), E.9.c.(ii)(b) & 
E.12.e.(ii)(c)) 
Uses a narrative standard approach for 
regulating the MS4 local governments 
without detailed guidelines outlining the 
actions of the permittees (TXR040000, 
2013, Part II.D.4., & Parts III.B.4.(a)) 
Uses a mix of a numerical/quantifiable 
approach and a narrative standard 
approach for regulating the MS4 local 
governments with a limited detailed 
guide outlining the actions of the 
permittees (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, 
Sections: I.C.2.(a) (1-12), and II.B.1.(3) 
(c)) 
Uses a mix of a numerical/quantifiable 
approach and a narrative standard 
approach for regulating the MS4 local 
governments with detailed guidelines 
outlining the actions of the permittees 
(MNR040000, 2013, Parts: III.F.2.(a), 
III.F.2.(d), & III.D.3.(g)) 
Coercion 
Includes a breakdown of the sanctions 
but not information on how/when to use 
them (CAS000004, 2013, sectiona: 
E.6.a.(ii)(i-j), & E.6.c.(ii)). 
Does not provide a breakdown of all the 
procedures that the MS4 local 
government should follow to detect non-
compliance (TXR040000, 2013, Part 
III.A.3.(a) (2) (j- h), Part III.A.6., & Part 
IV.B) 
Encourages progressive compliance and 
enforcement strategy, but does not 
provide a breakdown of all the 
procedures that the MS4 local 
government should follow to detect non-
compliance (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, 
Sections: II.B.1.(3)(b) & II.B.1.(4)(c)(8)) 
Provides a limited breakdown of all the 
procedures that the MS4 local 
government should follow in case it 
detects a case of non-compliance 
(MNR040000, 2013, Parts: II.D.3& 
III.B.2) 
Education 
Requires certification for stormwater-
related employees  (CAS000004, 2013, 
section: E.7.b.(2)). 
Does not require any certification or 
qualification required for the MS4 local 
government stormwater-related 
employees (TXR040000, 2013, Part 
III.B.2.(c)(2) & Part III.B.3.(b)(7)) 
Requires certification for stormwater-
related employees  (9VAC25-890-40, 
2013, Section: II.B.1.(4)(c)(3)) 
Does not require any certification or 
qualification required for MS4 local 
government stormwater-related 
employees 
(MNR040000, 2013, Part III.D.6. (g)(1-
3)) 
Prioritization 
Gives a waiver option, but it is up for 
review every year and subject to fees 
(CAS000004, 2013, sections: A.3.b.(3) 
& A.3.a.). 
Has different MS4 local government 
categories, different waiver options, and 
no annual waiver evaluation and fees 
(TXR040000, 2013, Part II.A.5., Part 
II.B., Parts II.E.6.(a), Part II.E.10., & 
Part II.E.13.) 
Does not provide details about the 
waiver option but allows changes and 
implementation transfer (9VAC25-890-
40, 2013, Sections: II.B.1.(6)(D) and  
II.B.1.(6)(F)(1)(a)) 
Does not provide details about the 
waiver option but allows changes and 
implementation transfer 
(MNR040000, 2013, Parts: I.D. & 
III.G.3).  
Accommodation 
Adopts formal institutions in the form of 
regional water boards to address the 
stakeholders’ opinions (CAS000004, 
2013, section: G.). 
Requires legislative due process, and 
calls for considering entering cooperative 
relationships among the subjected MS4 
local government (TXR040000, 2013, 
Part II.E.16.(b-j), Part III.A.3.(a) (2)(i), 
Part III.B.1.(a)(5)) 
Requires formal collaboration and 
legislative due process  (9VAC25-890-
40, 2013, Sections: I.B.2.(a), 
II.B.1.(2)(c), and I.C.2.(b) (3)) 
Requires legislative due process and 
annual public input but does not present 
any proposed framework for cooperation 
(MNR040000, 2013, Parts: II.D.1 & 
III.D.2.(a)(1)).  
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Since then, the California SWRCB has become a major player in implementing federal 
stormwater management policies. According to Cousins (2017a), the State Water Resources 
Control Board is responsible for setting the regulatory guidelines of the stormwater permits, 
while the Regional Boards hold the authority to incorporate additional requirements and to grant 
permits to the regulated entities within their jurisdictions; thus, the regulated entities are under a 
dual authority. For example, the MS4 local government is subject to a state permit and special 
requirements that have been established for the permit issued to it by the board for the region in 
which it is located. However, this study reviews only the statewide MS4 permit, or the 
CAS000004 of 2013, since the regionally-specific permit requirements may contain variations 
according to the challenges faced by each region, making it difficult to obtain a full picture of the 
institutional arrangements of all local governments subject to MS4 regulation 
3.5.1.1.1 Formalism 
Formalism in the context of this study refers to the way the state government crafts the 
language of its MS4 permit. Specifically, this review aims to answer the following question: How 
detailed is the MS4 permit regarding the implementation process? Based on the California 
CAS000004 MS4 permit, it can be stated that the state is following a more numerical and 
quantifiable approach for the specific stormwater controls or management measures. The permit 
gives the MS4 local governments detailed requirements and specifies the actions that they must 
adopt in their local ordinances and practices framed by a specific time frame for implementing the 
program. For example, the permit requires the MS4 local governments to adopt local ordinances 
according to the following specification: 
1) Effectively require the discharger to abate and clean up their discharge, spill, or 
pollutant release within 72 hours of notification; high-risk spill should be cleaned up 
as soon as possible. 
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2) Require abatement within 30 days of notification, for uncontrolled sources of 
pollutants that could pose an environmental threat. (CAS000004, 2013, section: 
E.6.a.(ii)(h)). 
These requirements should be formulated by the MS4 local government ordinances, 
which would limit local governments to have discretion over the implementation. Concerning the 
education process, we found that a statement requires the local government to carry out 
approximately 12 types of activities related to the education process, which vary from 
developing a specific awareness-raising message to a request to measure the level of community 
awareness through a survey conducted every two years. Nevertheless, the MS4 permit provides a 
set of requirements to teach and train local government employees and targeted groups for 
implementation (like contractors, developers… etc.) working within the boundaries of the 
desirable government authority. Moreover, MS4 local governments are required to conduct a 
stormwater quality test within a three-day period of the occurrence of rain according to a set of 
numerical standards and measures specified in Sections E.9.c.(ii)(a) and E.9.c.(ii)(b). For 
example, the MS4 local government is required to conduct an analysis to ensure that ammonia 
does not exceed 50 mg/L in the sample subject to analysis. In addition, MS4 permits provide 
about twelve kinds of post-construction stormwater management requirements, along with 
subsequent requirements under each implementation action. The post-construction stormwater 
management requirements also function as volume-based performance standards for new 
development, as presented in Section E.12.e.(ii)(c). 
3.5.1.1.2 Coercion 
This section is dedicated to reviewing the way states deal with noncompliance. The study 
seeks to answer the following question: How is non-compliance addressed in the MS4 permit? 
On the basis of the California CAS000004 MS4 permit, it can be seen that the permit provides a 
66 
breakdown of all the procedures that the MS4 local government should follow if it detects a case 
of non-compliance. The MS4 requires the MS4 local government to develop a Permittee 
Enforcement Response Plan that levies citations, administrative fines, civil sanctions, or criminal 
sanctions (CAS000004, 2013, Section E.6.a.(ii)(i-j)). Further, the MS4 permit provides a 
breakdown of the sanctions, which include verbal warnings, written notices, monetary fines, civil 
and administrative penalties, stop-work orders, and/or withholding of plan approvals or other 
authorizations (CAS000004, 2013, Section E.6.c.(ii)). However, the MS4 permit does not 
determine the size of any of these penalties or a specification of the cases in which each type 
should be used. 
3.5.1.1.3 Education 
This part of the analysis reviews how the permits address the educational needs of the 
MS4 local government as the program's implementation may require skills ranging from legal 
and administrative skills to environmental science specialization. The California CAS000004 
MS4 permit addresses the educational needs of the MS4 local government by requiring the 
stormwater employee to be a certified Storm Water Pollution Prevention Plan (SWPPP) 
Developer (QSD) or an SWPPP Practitioner (QSP) (CAS000004, 2013, section: E.7.b.(2)). By 
including these requirements, the permit requires that the workers who implement it have a 
degree of qualification that enables them to carry out the necessary tasks. Moreover, the MS4 
permit requires that employees with each type of qualification assume different roles as QSDs to 
supervise plan reviews or as QSPs to supervise inspection operations. In addition, the California 
Water Boards (n.d.) identify nine organizations in which MS4 local government employees can 
enroll in programs to obtain certification. Finally, the MS4 permit does not require the MS4 local 
government employees to obtain any training from the state government agency.  
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3.5.1.1.4 Prioritization 
Prioritization relates to how the MS4 permit addresses the contextual differences between 
the permittees. The California CAS000004 MS4 permit addresses the contextual differences 
between the permittees as stated in the following: 
Small MS4s face highly variable conditions both in terms of threats to water quality from 
their storm water discharges and resources available to manage those discharges. 
Therefore, one set of prescriptive requirements is not an appropriate regulatory approach 
for all Regulated Small MS4s. (p. 9) 
 
In other words, the permit indicates that there are differences among the local governments that 
are subject to legislation. To address such differences, the MS4 permit provides a waiver option 
for “communities outside of urbanized areas with a population of 20,000 or less with an annual 
median household income (MHI) that is less than 80 percent of the statewide annual MHI” 
(CAS000004, 2013, p.9). However, the MS4 permit links the waiver granted to a set of other 
requirements such as not contributing to the emission of the pollutant or determining that storm 
water BMPs are not needed (CAS000004, 2013, Section A.3.b.(3)). However, such local 
governments would have to submit an annual waiver request and pay any fees and any other 
“applicable surcharge” (CAS000004, 2013, Section: A.3.a.). Therefore, the waiver status of MS4 
local governments is under review annually. 
3.5.1.1.5 Accommodation 
Since stormwater quality is a collective action problem, it requires the cooperation and 
collaboration between the stakeholders engaged in the implementation process to achieve the 
policy outcomes; therefore, this section concerns the MS4 permit’s response to this need, 
formally or informally. Although California’s CAS000004 MS4 permit acknowledges the need 
for “close collaboration and cooperation among the Permittees” and other agencies, it adopts 
formal mechanisms for addressing the cooperation and collaboration needs by giving the 
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Regional Water Boards the authority for “reviewing reports, requiring modification to 
stormwater program components and various submissions, imposing region-specific monitoring 
requirements, conducting inspections and program evaluations (audits), taking enforcement 
actions against violators” (CAS000004, 2013, Section G.). In other words, the Regional Water 
Boards oversee the action of the MS4 local governments and ensure that their behavior is in line 
with the permit requirements. The role of the State Water Pollution Control Board is limited to 
setting policies and resolving disputes that may arise between the Regional Water Boards and the 
MS4 local governments.  
3.5.1.1.6 Stormwater Quality Status 
Table 4.5 represents the status of stormwater quality in the state of California. It should 
be noted that the state of California issued a report that combines data from the years between 
2014 and 2016 and includes six regions, as follow: 
Regional Water Quality Control Boards (Regional Water Boards) for the San Francisco 
Bay (Region 2), Central Coast (Region 3), Los Angeles (Region 4), Central Valley 
(Region 5), Santa Ana (Region 8), and San Diego (Region 9) regions. (p. ii) 
 
In addition, the 2014/2016 report included baseline information for the regions that were not 
included in these reporting cycles. On the other hand, the 2018 report includes the remaining 
regions with an update of the status of the first six regions. Thus, both reports include the status 
of state water quality regardless of the region.  
On the basis of the information in Table 4.5, it is clear that in 2014/2016 (a total of four 
years of monitoring), the level of detected stormwater pollution was low since there was a 
detected in only approximately 5% of the water segments/events assessed for water quality. At 
the other end of the scale, in the 2018 report, the level of detection of stormwater pollution was 
higher. It was detected in over 6% of the water segments/events assessed of water quality. 
69 
Although it cannot be ascertained whether these differences are statistically significant or valid 
to establish causality, these reports indicate that within the four years of 2012-2016, 313 
pollutants were detected, while in only the two years of 2016-2018, 269 were detected. This 
increase may have been caused by urban expansion or a change in monitoring density. However, 
these possible reasons cannot negate the fact that there has been an increase in the number of 
cases of stormwater pollution. 
Table 3.5: California Stormwater Quality Status 
Year Total Number of Assessment Units for Impairments 
Pollution Detected from 
Urban Runoff/Storm Sewers 
and Industrial/Commercial 
Site Stormwater Discharge 
Total Number of 
Segment 
Impairments 
2014/2016 6,043 water segments/events 313 water segments/events  4,367 water segments 
2018  4,373 water segments/events 269 water segments/events  4,368 water segments 
 
 Texas 
Texas administers stormwater regulation through a single state agency named the Texas 
Commission on Environmental Quality (TCEQ), which issues and oversees the implementation 
of the state MS4 permit No. TXR040000 through its regional offices. According to the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (2016), the Texas MS4 permit does not contain any common 
legal constraints similar to those in the rest of the states, such as “on-site retention/volume 
control, treatment requirement, channel protection requirement, flood control requirement, 
redevelopment standard, special criteria, or offset /mitigation” (p. 106). Considering the 
differences in Texas MS4 permits, this study reviews the statewide MS4 permit, which is 
TXR040000 from 2013. 
3.5.1.2.1 Formalism 
Texas MS4 permit No. TXR040000 follows a narrative standard approach for regulating 
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the MS4 local governments within the state. The permit does not give the MS4 local 
governments detailed requirements or specify actions that they must adopt in their local 
ordinances and/or practices to implement the program. On the other hand, the MS4 permit makes 
narrative requirements subject to the MS4 local government’s discretion. For example, the 
permit requires the subject MS4 local government to develop a Stormwater Management 
Program (SWMP) that includes targeted controls, measurable goals, identification of 
benchmarks, and other best management practices (BMPs) (TXR040000, 2013, Part II.D.4.). 
However, none of these requirements includes the specification of numerical values or 
quantifiable measures of any element of the SWMP. Another example of such a narrative 
standard approach is seen in the requirements for the post-construction program, for which the 
permit states that permittees should develop, implement, and enforce such program, but it does 
not provide any numerical values or quantifiable measures (TXR040000, 2013, Parts III.B.4.(a)).  
3.5.1.2.2 Coercion 
Texas MS4 permit No. TXR040000 does not provide a breakdown of all the procedures 
that the MS4 local government should follow if it detects a case of non-compliance. However, 
the MS4 permit requires the MS4 local government to develop a standard operating procedure 
(SOP) that include some penalties, whether monetary, civil, or criminal, in their local ordinances 
(TXR040000, 2013, Part III.A.3.(a) (2) (j- h), & Part III.A.6.). The MS4 permit does not provide 
details regarding how or when such actions should be enforced. On the other hand, the MS4 
permit requires the MS4 local government to report any non-compliance event to the TCEQ 
Regional Office and the TCEQ Enforcement Division within no more than five days of the event 
(TXR040000, 2013, Part IV.B). Such legal requirements place the state agency at the center of 
any violation of the permit requirements. 
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3.5.1.2.3 Education 
Texas MS4 permit No. TXR040000 does not require any certification or qualification for 
the MS4 local government stormwater-related employees. On the contrary, the permit requires 
the MS4 local governments to subject the personnel involved in stormwater management to a 
training course according to their discretionary needs and subject to state agency review if 
needed (TXR040000, 2013, Part III.B.2.(c)(2) & Part III.B.3.(b)(7)). In other words, the MS4 
local government determines its training needs and designs or pays for a training program that 
covers this need and enrolls employees in these programs. Nevertheless, the state agency 
reserves the right to review the training programs if it deems this necessary. 
3.5.1.2.4 Prioritization 
Texas MS4 permit No. TXR040000 divides MS4 local governments into four categories 
according to the population size, as follow: Level 1 designates an urban area that has a 
population of less than 10000, Level 2 designates an urban area that has a population of at least 
10000, but less than 40000, Level 3 designates an urban area that has a population of at least 
40,000 but less than 100,000, and Level 4 designates an urban area that has a population of 
100,000 or more (TXR040000, 2013, Part II.A.5.). In addition, the MS4 permit recognizes the 
fact that these levels are subject to change due to any possible acquiring or giving up land via the 
annexing processes. Moreover, the MS4 permit offers two options for waiving the requirements 
for MS4 local governments: the first is for governments with a population of less than 1,000, and 
it does not require a review by the state agency; the second is for governments whose population 
is less than 10,000, and it requires a state agency review to determine that controls are not 
needed (TXR040000, 2013, Part II.B.). The MS4 permit does not require any fees or annual 
renewal for waivers (TXR040000, 2013, Part II.E.13.). Further, the Texas MS4 permit gives 
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MS4 local governments the freedom to make changes without referring to the state agency in a 
number of cases involving adding additional controls, areas, or adding clarifications to other 
existing BMPs (TXR040000, 2013, Parts II.E.6.(a)). MS4 local governments can also change 
their responsibility for the implementation and transfer it to other entities after informing the 
state agency that they will do so (TXR040000, 2013, Part II.E.10.). 
3.5.1.2.5 Accommodation 
The Texas MS4 permit addresses the stakeholders' opinions within the MS4 local 
government domain via certain requirements. First, local governments must follow the 
legislative due process by carrying out actions such as publishing a notice and receiving and 
responding to public comments (TXR040000, 2013, Part II.E.16.(b-j)). Second, the MS4 permit 
calls on MS4 local governments to adopt ordinances that consider the possibility of entering into 
cooperative relationships with other MS4 local governments (TXR040000, 2013, Part III.A.3.(a) 
(2)(i)). Finally, collaboration is directly encouraged through the inclusion of the following 
statement in the permit: “MS4 operators may partner with other MS4 operators to maximize the 
program and cost effectiveness of the required outreach” (TXR040000, 2013, Part III.B.1.(a)(5)). 
In other words, the permit suggests that local governments can overcome the cost of 
implementation and increase effectiveness through cooperation.  
3.5.1.2.6 Stormwater Quality Status 
Table 4.6 presents the status of stormwater quality in the state of Texas. On the basis of 
its content, it is evident that the level of deducted stormwater pollution in 2014 was high since it 
was detected in about 77.78% of the water segments/events that were assessed for water quality. 
On the other end, in the 2018 report, the level of detected stormwater pollution was lower. It was 
detected in about 70% of the water segments/events assessed for water quality. The 2018 report 
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indicated that the state was able to reduce the level of detected stormwater pollution by about 
11% as compared to the 2014 report. Although it cannot be ascertained whether these differences 
are statistically significant or valid to establish causality, these reports indicate that Texas 
witnessed a decrease in stormwater pollution. 
Table 3.6: Texas Stormwater Quality Status 
Year Total Number of Assessment Units for Impairments 
Pollution Detected from 
Urban Runoff/Storm Sewers 
and Industrial/Commercial 
Site Stormwater Discharge 
Total Number of 
Segment 
Impairments 
2014 986 water segments/events 767 water segments/events  589 water segments 
2018  979 water segments/events 685 water segments/events  583 water segments 
 
 Virginia 
The Virginia Department of Environmental Quality administers the Commonwealth's 
statewide stormwater program, named the Virginia Stormwater Management Program. In 
addition, the Virginia Department of Environmental Quality issues and oversees the statewide 
stormwater MS4 permit No. 9VAC25-890-40 of 2013. According to Nobles, Goodall, and Fitch 
(2017), the Virginia Stormwater Management Program gives customers credit toward their utility 
fees if they have implemented measures limiting stormwater pollution in their establishments. 
For example, if a private or commercial real estate owner has installed some green practices to 
clean stormwater or reduce its flow, the owner may receive a utility credit. Considering the 
progressiveness of the Virginia Stormwater Management Program, this study reviews the 
statewide MS4 permit, which is 9VAC25-890-40 of 2013. 
3.5.1.3.1 Formalism 
The Virginia MS4 permit No. 9VAC25-890-40 follows a mix of a numerical/quantifiable 
approach and a narrative standard approach for regulating the MS4 local governments within the 
74 
state. For example, the permit provides set limits on the levels and types of pollution that the 
local government must enforce and provides guidance on how to estimate the existing source 
loads and the reductions required (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Sections I.C.2.(a) (1-12)). On the 
other hand, the MS4 permit gives a narrative standard of the other stormwater management 
requirements. For example, the permit does not give numerical or quantifiable requirements for 
illicit discharge screening and detection (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Section II.B.1.(3) (c)). It should 
be noted that the focus in the state program is on treatment standards (US Environmental 
Protection Agency, 2016); thus, the use of a numerical/quantifiable approach was limited on 
purpose to give more discretion to the MS4 local government regarding the practices of 
implementing the permit requirements. 
3.5.1.3.2 Coercion 
Virginia MS4 permit No. 9VAC25-890-40 does not provide a breakdown of all the 
procedures that the MS4 local government should follow if it detects a case of non-compliance. 
By contrast, the permit requires MS4 local governments to put in place measures to investigate 
and limit pollution (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Section II.B.1.(3)(b)). The MS4 permit encourages 
the MS4 local governments to adopt a “progressive compliance and enforcement strategy” in 
their local ordinances to ensure implementation of the stormwater standards (9VAC25-890-40, 
2013, Section II.B.1.(4)(c)(8)). However, the MS4 permit does not explain how such progressive 
strategies should be implemented.   
3.5.1.3.3 Education 
Virginia MS4 permit No. 9VAC25-890-40 requires a certification for the MS4 local 
government stormwater-related employees who are responsible for the task of carrying out 
inspections (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Section: II.B.1.(4)(c)(3)). According to Virginia 
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Administrative Code 9VAC25-850-50 (n.d.), stormwater-related employees can be certified after 
completing 800 hours of experience or 12 months of a board-approved training program. Further, 
Virginia Administrative Code 9VAC25-850-50 (n.d.) indicates that the stormwater plan reviewer 
and stormwater inspector need to receive different certifications. In other words, the Virginia 
Stormwater Management Program distinguishes between the different educational needs of 
different practitioners in stormwater management jobs.  
3.5.1.3.4 Prioritization 
Virginia MS4 permit No. 9VAC25-890-40 gives the MS4 local governments the ability 
to change their responsibility for the implementation and transfer it to other entities after 
informing the state agency that they will do so (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Sections: II.B.1.(6)(D)). 
However, the MS4 permit does not exempt the government from being subject to penalties for 
non-compliance or to legal liability if a case of non-compliance occurs. In addition, the MS4 
permit gives MS4 local governments the freedom to make changes without reporting them to the 
state agency in a number of cases involving adding additional controls or areas or adding 
clarifications to other existing BMPs (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Sections: II.B.1.(6)(F)(1)(a)). 
Finally, the Virginia MS4 permit does not provide details about exemptions for local 
governments from the permit requirements.  
3.5.1.3.5 Accommodation 
Virginia MS4 permit No. 9VAC25-890-40 recognizes the stakeholders' opinions within 
the MS4 local government domains in different forms. The MS4 permit recognizes that inter-
jurisdictional agreements can be utilized to address the permit requirements (9VAC25-890-40, 
2013, Sections: I.B.2.(a)). In addition, the MS4 permit asks MS4 local governments within the 
same basin to implement a plan to manage stormwater collectively via establishing a 
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memorandum of understanding (MOU) between the MS4 operators (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, 
Section I.C.2.(b) (3)). Finally, the MS4 permit requires the MS4 local governments to follow due 
process when adopting their stormwater plans (9VAC25-890-40, 2013, Section II.B.1.(2)(c)).  
3.5.1.3.6 Stormwater Quality Status 
Table 4.7 presents the status of stormwater quality in the state of Virginia. Virginia has 
issued a direct comparison between pollution levels of urban stormwater and other pollutants 
from other areas, such as the agricultural sector.  Virginia measures stormwater pollution 
according to three criteria: nitrogen, phosphorus, and sediment. The information in Table 4.7 
shows that the level of detected stormwater nitrogen pollution in the 2009-2014 report was 
higher (over 17%) than it was in 2013-2018 (over 14%). In other words, the stormwater nitrogen 
pollution in the 2013-2018 report is lower than it was in the past. However, stormwater 
phosphorus pollution rose in the same period.  
Table 3.7: Virginia Stormwater Quality Status 
 Units 2009-2014 2013-2018 Change 
Total VA Land Area # Acres 2,528,960 2,898,471 369511 
% of VA Land  % 10.09 11.6 1.51 
Total Nitrogen  106 Kg/year 5.42 9.2 3.78 
% of all other sources  % 17.20 14.3 -2.9 
Total Phosphorus  106 Kg/year 0.51 1.0 0.49 
% of all sources % 22.98 29.5 6.52 
Total Sediment  106 Kg/year 0.12 185 184.88 
% of all sources % 4.04 7.7 3.66 
 
According to the 2009-2014 report, the stormwater phosphorus pollution was about 23%, but it 
increased to about 30% according to the 2013-2018 report. Similarly, stormwater sediment 
pollution increased in the 2013-2018 report to about 8% compared to 4% in the 2009-2014 
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report. Although it cannot be ascertained whether these differences are statistically significant or 
valid to establish causality, these reports indicate that Virginia witnessed an increase in some 
aspects of stormwater pollution while witnessing a decrease in others.  
 Minnesota 
The Minnesota Pollution Control Agency administers the statewide stormwater program 
and issues the state MS4 permit No. MNR040000. Minnesota is one of the states that has 
established independent institutions; the Minnesota GreenStep Cities Program brings together 
many government and non-government institutions to support local governments in adopting 
sustainable environmental practices, including stormwater management practices (Minnesota 
GreenStep, n.d.). Via the Minnesota GreenStep Cities Program, MS4 local government has 
access to management experiences and practices followed by similar governments to ensure 
permit compliance. With a focus on volunteer compliance by the state agency, this study reviews 
the statewide MS4 permit, which is MNR040000 of 2013. 
3.5.1.4.1 Formalism 
Minnesota MS4 permit No. MNR040000 follows a mix of a numerical/quantifiable 
approach and a detailed narrative standard approach for regulating the MS4 local governments 
within the state. The Minnesota MS4 permit requires the MS4 local government to follow 
numerical/quantifiable limitations on discharge to stormwater (MNR040000, 2013, Part 
III.F.2.(d)). In addition, the numerical standards are followed by a detailed explanation of the 
expected implementation process along with required timing and sampling procedures 
(MNR040000, 2013, Part III.F.2.(d) & Part III.F.2.(a)). Thus, the Minnesota MS4 permit differs 
from the Virginia MS4 permit in that it uses narrative standards to support 
numerical/quantifiable standards.  
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3.5.1.4.2 Coercion 
The Minnesota MS4 permit No. MNR040000 provides a limited breakdown of all the 
procedures that the MS4 local government should follow in case it detects a case of non-
compliance. The MS4 permit requires the MS4 local governments to adopt Enforcement 
Response Procedures, which should be enforced in the event of non-compliance (MNR040000, 
2013, Part II.D.3). The MS4 permit requires the MS4 local governments to document any 
violation under the process indicated by the permit, which includes filing the date and location, a 
description of the violation, and enforcement actions “(e.g., written notice, citation, stop-work 
order, withholding of local authorizations, etc.)” (MNR040000, 2013, Part II.B.2.). Therefore, it 
is clear that the Minnesota MS4 permit provides a limited breakdown of the required coercion 
that the MS4 local governments can follow to ensure compliance with the permit.  
3.5.1.4.3 Education 
Minnesota MS4 permit No. MNR040000 does not require any certification or 
qualification for MS4 local government stormwater-related employees. However, the permit 
requires the MS4 local governments to subject the personnel involved in stormwater 
management to a training course according to a set of narrative standards such as that the training 
program “addresses the importance of protecting water quality” and “cover the requirements of 
the permit relevant to the job duties” (MNR040000, 2013, Part III.D.6. (g)(1-3)). Nevertheless, 
the MS4 permit does not indicate that the state agency reserves any the right to review the 
training programs of the MS4 local governments.  
 Prioritization 
Minnesota MS4 permit No. MNR040000 gives MS4 local governments the ability to 
change their responsibility for implementation and transfer it to other entities after informing the 
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state agency that they will do so (MNR040000, 2013, Part I.D.). In addition, the MS4 permit 
gives MS4 local governments the freedom to make changes without reporting this to the state 
agency in a number of cases involving adding additional controls or areas or the addition of 
clarifications to other existing BMPs (MNR040000, 2013, III.G.3). Finally, the MS4 permit does 
not provide details about exemptions for local governments from the permit requirements.  
3.5.1.5.1 Accommodation 
Minnesota MS4 permit No. MNR040000 recognizes the stakeholders' opinions within the 
MS4 local government domain in different forms. The MS4 permit recognizes that inter-
jurisdictional agreements can be utilized to address the permit requirement (MNR040000, 2013, 
Part II.D.1). In addition, the MS4 permit requires MS4 local governments to follow due process 
when adopting their stormwater plans, as well as giving the “opportunity annually for the public 
to provide input on the adequacy” of their plans (MNR040000, 2013, III.D.2.(a)(1)). Finally, the 
Minnesota MS4 permit does not present any proposed framework for cooperation between MS4 
local governments.  
3.5.1.5.2 Stormwater Quality Status 
Table 4.8 represents the status of stormwater quality in the state of Minnesota. The 
information in Table 4.8 makes it clear that the level of detected turbidity stormwater pollution in 
2010 was high since it was detected in about 33% of the water segments/events that were 
assessed for water quality. On the other end, in the 2018 report, the level of detected turbidity 
stormwater pollution was lower since it was detected in about 21% of the water segments/events 
that were assessed for water quality. Although it cannot be ascertained whether these differences 
are statistically significant or valid to establish causality, these reports indicate that Minnesota 
witnessed a decrease in stormwater pollution. 
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Table 3.8: Minnesota Stormwater Quality Status 
Year Total Number of Assessment Units for Impairments Turbidity Pollution Deducted 
Total Number of Segment 
Impairments 
2010 17,684 water segments/events 5,887 water segments/events  11,559 water segments 
2018  26,797 water segments/events 5,704 water segments/events  16,787 water segments 
 
3.5.2 Discussion 
The information in Figure 3.1 makes it clear that there is a centralization spectrum in the 
institutional arrangements adopted by states to implement stormwater regulation. Starting with 
the most centralized institutional arrangement, that of California, the discretion of MS4 local 
governments is highly restricted. For example, the California MS4 permit takes a detailed 
guideline approach with numerical and quantifiable standards that would limit the ability of MS4 
local governments to align legal requirements with local needs. In addition, the California MS4 
permit establishes detailed requirements regarding the process of enforcing the legislation and 
dealing with non-compliance that may limit the ability of MS4 local governments to build a 
collaborative implementation relationship with their citizens who are subject to compliance. The 
California MS4 permit also requires MS4 local governments to subject their staff to an 
accreditation procedure, which will raise the cost of running the program by requiring the 
obtaining of qualified staff and assisting them in maintaining their qualifications; thus, it will add 
a financial burden that local governments must bear. The California MS4 permit increases the 
financial burden of the exempt MS4 local governments via the annual application requirements 
and the waiver fees. Finally, the California MS4 permit formalizes any collective action by 
delegating enforcement and monitoring powers to regional boards; thus, MS4 local governments 
do not have the power to decide whether or not to cooperate and be subject to power struggles 
within the regional organization.  
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Figure 3.1: The Stormwater Institutional Arrangement Centralization Spectrum 
 
 
Similarly, both Virginia and Minnesota have adopted somewhat centralized institutional 
arrangements to implement stormwater regulation. However, the Virginia MS4 permit is more 
centralized than the Minnesota MS4 permit as it decentralizes only the enforcement requirements 
while centralizing all the other dimensions of the permit. Although the Virginia MS4 permit 
encourages progressive compliance, it does not place any requirements (limitations) the local 
government must follow in the enforcement or in cases of non-compliance; thus, the local 
governments have some authority to adopt enforcement methods that suit their own needs. In 
contrast, the Minnesota MS4 permit centralizes the enforcement aspect, but it decentralizes the 
employees’ qualification requirements and the cooperation decisions between the MS4 local 
governments. Such decentralization can reduce financial burdens and may contribute to building 
a cooperative relationship of a voluntary nature among members.  
California, Virginia, and Minnesota coincide on one issue: the inclusion of volumetric 
requirements in their permits. Despite the risks associated with this type of centralization of 
stormwater quality requirements, some researchers believe that such a volumetric approach to 
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controlling stormwater can help to combine technical needs and political interests (Cousins, 
2017b). However, Cousins (2017b) points out that such a volumetric approach must take into 
account local needs as well as environmental needs. In other words, the decision of a particular 
party to deal with stormwater through volume measurement (e.g., by discharging 30% in 
redirection to another party) may lead to repercussions for society and the environment. In this 
regard, Porse and Pincetl (2018) studied the impact of volumetric stormwater practices in Los 
Angeles upstream on the downstream basins. According to Porse and Pincetl (2018), practices at 
Los Angeles upstream basins impacted the level of streamflow, which in turn has affected the 
amount of water available to support aquatic habitats and other uses in the downstream basins. 
On the other hand, Harmel et al. (2016) stated that the measuring of pollution levels in storm 
water faces many dilemmas that make accurate measurement difficult to achieve. Therefore, the 
inclusion of many volumetric standards may create another dilemma with negative impacts on 
the environment and society.  
In contrast to other states, Texas has adopted a decentralized institutional arrangement to 
implementing stormwater regulation. The Texas MS4 permit follows a narrative standard 
approach, and it does not place any precedent on local governments in terms of enforcement, 
training, or cooperation. Nevertheless, the Texas MS4 permit is the most prioritized toward the 
local level as it divides the types of MS4 cities into four levels and reduces the requirements for 
exceptions. In addition, according to the USEPA (2016), the narrative standard approach is 
commonly used in many states, including Alabama, Illinois, Arkansas, Louisiana, New Mexico, 
Oklahoma, Iowa, Kansas, Missouri, Nebraska, South Dakota, Wyoming, Arizona, Hawaii, 
Alaska, Idaho, and Oregon. These states represent nearly half of the states that have assumed the 
authority to enforce stormwater legislation. However, it must be taken into account that each 
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state follows certain methods concerning other aspects of implementation, such as enforcement, 
training, or cooperative relations.  
In relation to the stormwater quality, the review of the stormwater permits in the four 
case studies presented above corresponds to the theoretical framework of this study, which 
proposes that the outputs of stormwater management policies are affected by the institutional 
arrangements adopted by the states. As evident from the changes in stormwater quality (the 
amount of pollution produced by stormwater), the changes in the institutional frameworks used 
to implement stormwater policies affect the outcomes of these policies. Nevertheless, this study 
found that not restricting the autonomy of local governments, the approach taken in Texas, may 
reduce the volume of pollution caused by stormwater, which contributes to achieving the goals 
of stormwater management policies. This result is consistent with Oates and Portney’s (2003) 
proposition that the problem of stormwater quality management measures should be dealt with 
according to the conditions of the local government. In other words, the local government must 
have sufficient independence to reconcile legislative requirements with local needs. On the other 
hand, this study contradicts Millimet's (2013) argument that the desired environmental results 
will not be achieved by decentralizing the implementation of the policy. On the contrary, this 
paper found that the increase in decentralization leads to a noticeable increase in the positive 
outcomes of the policy. On the other hand, an increase in centralization may lead to a noticeable 
decrease in the policy’s desired results, as is the case with stormwater quality in California. 
Interestingly, the current study found a difference between states with mixed institutional 
arrangements. For example, Virginia focuses on centralizing stormwater management standards, 
education requirements, and formal cooperative arrangements among the MS4 local 
governments. However, stormwater quality results in the state indicate that the problem is 
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increasing overall. In contrast, Minnesota has focused on centralizing the standards and the 
enforcement in comparison to the rest of the dimensions of the analysis. Nevertheless, Minnesota 
has seen a decrease in the pollution caused by stormwater. Therefore, it could be argued that the 
decentralizing of education and the cooperative relationships between the MS4 local 
governments may reduce pollution. This finding is compatible with Sigman’s (2014) findings 
that decentralization does not increase the overall pollution. Finally, this study’s results indicate 
that the disparity in the centralization and decentralization of the institutional arrangements 
adopted by states to implement the constitutional policies related to stormwater management will 
affect the outcomes of these policies, which aim at reducing the level of pollution resulting from 
stormwater. 
Finally, it is worth noting that this study does not aim to establish a causal relationship 
between the institutional arrangements followed to implement stormwater management policies 
and stormwater quality. On the contrary, this study has explored the types of institutional 
arrangements and compared the outcomes of each arrangement according to the criteria 
published by each state. Statistical models were not built to extract performance results; rather, 
performance results were presented according to state reports. Further, this study suffers from 
some limitations with regard to comparing the results among the states, as each state follows an 
independent method for measuring and monitoring stormwater pollution. Another limitation is 
the degree of accuracy in measuring the levels of pollution caused by stormwater, which may 
limit the quality of the data published by the states. Finally, it should be noted that each state 
adopts its own definition of pollution levels (the level that it considers pollution). A certain level 
of one type of pollutant may be acceptable in one state, but the same level may not be accepted 
and may be considered pollution in another state. Despite these limits, the reports used for this 
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study have been viewed and approved by the Federal Environmental Protection Agency, making 
them generally comparable because they are subject to review and approval by a single source. 
In other words, if the reports did not reflect the state of water quality in the state, the federal 
agency would not accept them; hence, these reports are representative despite their differences. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates the impact of the states' institutional arrangements on 
environmental policy outputs by focusing on stormwater. To achieve the research objectives, two 
gaps were identified in the research literature: works that did not consider institutional 
arrangements via specialized studies (environmental or engineering) and those focused on a 
single study case without comparing it with several other case studies. In response to these gaps, 
this study has built on local public economies theory and the Race to Bottom literature to explore 
the impact of the institutional arrangements for implementing the MS4 permits used in each state 
on performance in reducing the level of pollution in stormwater, which would fulfill the goal of 
Clean Water Act, which aims to preserve the quality of water from pollution. By utilizing four 
case studies on California, Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota, this study has followed a qualitative 
approach to analyze the policy documents (MS4 permits) used for implementing stormwater 
management in these states. This study's qualitative approach has included review, evaluation, 
and comparison vis-a-vis the four case studies along the five dimensions of permit formalism, 
coercion, education, prioritization, and accommodation. In addition, the study used the periodic 
reports issued by the states to review the state of stormwater quality in these states.  
The study found that states can be distributed across a spectrum of centralization and 
decentralization, along the five analytical dimensions. The study found that the outputs of 
stormwater management policies are affected by the institutional arrangements adopted by the 
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states, as evidenced by differences in stormwater quality in these states. This study will help 
public policymakers in the states compare the performance of their institutional arrangements 
with other institutional frameworks; in turn, this will help improve their choices in dealing with 
stormwater or other environmental policies. The paper results will also assist professionals in 
exploring the institutional arrangements in which they work within their states, which should 
help them increase their performance and improve their job outcomes. The study is aware that 
the use of case studies may result in findings with limited generalizability, and the stormwater 
quality differences may not be statistically significant or valid to establish causality. However, 
this exploratory study is based on the practices of the qualitative approach rooted in the literature 
on public administration and the self-reported status of stormwater quality by each state. 
Therefore, this study provides a valid overview of the impact of the policy institutional 
arrangements on the policy output.  
Finally, future research on the impact of the policy institutional arrangements on the 
policy output should focus on other elements that may impact the selection of institutional 
arrangements for policy implementation. In addition, future research should examine a larger 
sample of states to improve the generalizability of the results. All in all, future research may find 




ESSAY 2: LOCAL GOVERNMENTS’ COOPERATION DECISIONS 
4.1 Introduction 
The dilemma of implementing policies in light of the horizontal fragmentation lies in the 
ability of local governments to work jointly to meet the legislative burdens associated with the 
process of implementing public policies imposed on them by higher governments. The 
institutional arrangements of the United States of America affect its local governments through 
regulations and standards that aim to resolve certain collective action problems in policy areas 
such as the environment. Implementing stormwater policies (MS4 permits) imposes 
requirements on the regulated local governments (RLGs) and does not provide funding to meet 
these requirements. In other words, local governments that are subjected to the MS4 permits 
must secure funds to comply with the MS4 requirements. However, the EPA and its counterparts 
in the States devote resources to ensure compliance or issue violation fines, as occurred in Texas 
(TCEQ, 2013).  Moreover, compliance with the MS4 regulation requires cooperation between 
the RLGs, given that a drainage system may go through multiple cities. According to Minan 
(2005), the MS4 faces a legal dilemma because it requires a complete drainage system from the 
stormwater collection point to a discharge point; thus, the discharge may go through multiple 
cities, which raises multiple concerns about water pollution as well as about the economic cost 
associated with implementing the MS4 requirements. Since the implementation of the MS4 
permits by local governments is a form of regulatory burden, the question then centers on the 
factors that affect the RLGs’ cooperation choices through interlocal agreements for compliance, 
just as happens regarding service delivery. Specifically, this paper seeks to answer the following 
research question:  
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What are the factors that affect the regulated local governments’ decisions to join an 
interlocal agreement (ILA)?  
 
Thus, this paper investigates this missing link between the local governments that suffer 
from stormwater regulatory burdens (MS4) and the decision to enter an ILA. I investigate the 
factors that affect the RLGs’ decisions by using a cross-sectional research design that captures 
the decision to join an ILA. A logistic regression model is used to analyze a case study consisting 
of 119 cities that are subjected to MS4 permits within the Dallas–Fort Worth (DFW) region in 
Texas. Since the decision of an RLG to join an ILA is rarely discussed or empirically examined, 
this article expands on the interlocal cooperation literature by examining the effects of 
geographic ties on RLGs’ decision to join ILAs. In addition, this study expands the interlocal 
cooperation literature beyond a focus on public services provision and delivery to link 
cooperation with regulatory burdens. Studying the MS4 regulations also contributes to filling a 
significant gap in collective action policies literature related to stormwater problems. Finally, the 
study results help researchers and professionals identify the impact of geographical boundaries 
and other factors on their decisions to join ILAs. 
4.2 Literature Review 
4.2.1 Imposed Standards and Stormwater Regulatory Burdens 
The regulations and standards imposed by higher authorities can become regulatory 
burdens on local governments. According to Esty (2016), compliance with the regulations and 
standards of the Department of Energy and Environmental Protection Agency and their 
counterparts in the States is associated with a cost paid either by individual users or by local 
entities. Similarly, Conlan, Riggle, and Schwartz (1995) argued that the Unfunded Mandate 
Reform Act of 1995 increased the already existing regulatory burdens on state and local 
governments by inserting enforceable duties on them without providing coverage of expenses. In 
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addition, Conlan, Riggle, and Schwartz (1995) stated that this unfunded mandate could cost state 
and local governments billions of dollars in compliance. The regulated local governments that 
the federal/state government requires to meet certain standards to comply with an unfunded 
mandate will then look for ways to reduce compliance costs.  
Regulatory burdens and compliance are very important issues involving stormwater 
management. According to the USEPA Clean Watersheds Needs Survey (2016) stormwater 
management program, the states need approximately twenty billion dollars to meet their 
regulatory and compliance obligations. The Water Infrastructure Finance and Innovation Act 
(2014) has established the Water Infrastructure and Resiliency Finance Center (WIRF) to help 
local governments with financing mechanisms. The WIRF (n.d.) includes cooperation as one of 
its strategic goals to help local governments deal with water quality, including stormwater 
management. WIRF's efforts to enhance cooperation between local governments to reduce the 
regulatory burdens associated with implementing the MS4 and reduce the cost of compliance are 
rooted in the long history of the local government service delivery cooperation. However, the 
literature on local government cooperation for service delivery and the theoretical frameworks 
for this literature has for a long time overlooked the possibility of cooperation through ILAs to 
meet regulatory burdens and reduce the cost of compliance with these burdens. The following 
section discusses the literature on local government cooperation for service delivery and the gap 
in our knowledge regarding the role of ILAs in meeting regulatory burdens imposed by 
federal/state requirements.  
4.2.2 Stormwater Management and Cooperation for Compliance 
Cooperation among local governments has received much attention in the public 
administration literature. The interest in studying interlocal cooperation stems from the federal 
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nature of the U.S., which limits the ability of localities to effectively meet the demand for 
services; consequently, they must seek solutions to work collaboratively with other localities to 
achieve the benefit of cost reduction and effectively deliver or produce services (Shrestha & 
Feiock, 2011). Based on this logic, much literature has studied the factors that influence the 
decisions of localities, especially cities, to enter into agreements with other localities to provide 
or exchange services (Seyler, 1974; Thurmaier & Wood, 2002; Jung & Kim, 2009; McGuire & 
Silvia, 2010; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011; Andrew & Hawkins, 2013). Moreover, the interlocal 
agreements or government-to-government contracts are among the essential tools of cooperation 
between cities, which has attracted the attention of a large number of researchers (Thurmaier & 
Wood, 2002; Chen & Thurmaier, 2009; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011; 
Zeemering, 2012). A discussion of stormwater management regulatory burdens and cooperation 
for compliance requires a review of work on stormwater management within the local 
government cooperation literature as well as within the environmental management literature. 
 Stormwater Management in the Local Government Cooperation Literature 
Under the institutional framework, ILAs are seen as voluntary and constituted by the self-
interest of the contract members (Kwon & Feiock, 2010). Therefore, most ILA studies discuss 
the factors that influence the voluntary decisions of local governments to join such contracts. For 
example, Shrestha and Feiock (2011) studied the relationship between the transaction 
characteristics of the services and the tendency to enter into ILAs in 163 cities in the State of 
Georgia. Based on the 2002 ICMA survey, this work found a curvilinear relationship between 
the two variables.  Another study conducted by Kwon and Feiock (2010) also focused on the 
self-interest and transaction aspects of ILAs using 2003 ICMA data from a survey of 3,215 
municipality officers. In this study, Kwon and Feiock (2010) found differences between two 
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stages of making an ILA decision: consideration of joining an ILA and the implementation of the 
ILA. 
Regarding consideration of joining an ILA, Kwon and Feiock (2010) tested three aspects: 
service demands, internal costs, and information costs; they found that service demands are the 
most important factor in this stage. At the implementation stage, they further investigated the 
negotiation/enforcement costs and the network relations, and they found that network relations 
are the most important factor for the success of an ILA. In contrast, Chen and Thurmaier (2009) 
studied the effect of perceived equitable sharing of costs in an ILA using a statewide survey of 
ILAs in Iowa covering the period from 1993 to 2004 and found that the success of ILAs is linked 
more to equitable sharing of benefits than to cost. The main finding in this area of research is that 
the desire to join an ILA stems from the internal need and not from impositions by higher 
authorities.  
Part of the reason that the interlocal agreement literature does not focus on the burden of 
regulatory compliance is the lack of in-depth details regarding services. According to Qiao, 
Kristoffersson, and Randrup (2018), stormwater management suffers from the lack of specific 
inclusion within the institutional framework of local government services. In other words, 
stormwater management may sometimes be considered a technical problem that is not pertaining 
to administrators. It is treated as one of the services associated with governmental (bureaucratic) 
institutional work. Further, Dhakal and Chevalier (2016) stated that specialized engineers 
primarily carry out stormwater management under a unified public work system or in 
independent departments. In addition, stakeholders inside or outside the local government do not 
interfere in the work of professionals because they consider that this work is complicated and 
concerns specialists only (Dhakal & Chevalier, 2016). The perception of the specialization of 
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stormwater management has influenced the way this issue has been addressed in the literature on 
local cooperation. This perception of the specialization of stormwater management has led ILA 
researchers to examine public works incompletely or to not provide sufficient details about the 
stormwater management issue. 
4.2.2.1.1 The Holistic View of Public Works ILAs 
Taking the holistic view of public works, Morgan, Hirlinger, and England (1988) 
examined local governments’ decisions regarding the external production of public works 
services by analyzing the decision of nearly sixty cities to contract with other local governments 
or external parties (profit or non-profit) to deliver services. Morgan, Hirlinger, and England 
(1988) found that the city location (within a Standard Metropolitan Area—MSA), tax rate 
limitations, community wealth (households with incomes of $30,000 or less), and organizational 
capacity (number of city employees) had a statistically positive significant impact on decisions 
regarding the external production of services. Similarly, Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) used 
International City Managers' Association data collected from more than 600 U.S. cities to test the 
impact of the city location (within an MSA) on local a government’s decision to utilize 
intergovernmental service contracts to produce/deliver public works. Morgan and Hirlinger 
(1991) found that the city location, organizational capacity as measured by the size of the budget 
spent on employees, and the form of government had a statistically positive significant impact on 
cities’ decisions to utilize ILAs for public works services.  The holistic view of public works 
explains cities’ ILA decisions in terms of the desire to reduce service costs, which would be 
visible only when a city has multiple service providers competing with each other by covering 
lowering the cost for the services. A city's location within a Standard Metropolitan Area 
facilitates the process of finding a sufficient number of suppliers for services. Consequently, the 
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city will choose an ILA that reduces the cost of producing and delivering the public works 
services. Therefore, the holistic view of public works articulates the decision to join an ILA in 
terms of the internal need for cost-saving by the local government. 
4.2.2.1.2 Specific ILAs for Stormwater Management 
Another stream within the ILA literature focuses on stormwater management issues but 
without regard to the issue of regulative burdens. For example, Wood (2006) examined nearly 
thirty intergovernmental service-delivery agreements among nearly fifty cities in the Kansas City 
region. Wood (2006) found that approximately seventy percent of the cities had set up ILAs to 
deliver stormwater services; on the other hand, nearly thirty percent of the cities were managing 
their stormwater internally (in in-house production). Wood (2006) characterized stormwater 
management as a system maintenance service. Thus, local governments were more likely to 
cooperate to deliver this service. This process is not visible to the citizens, and citizens have 
more narrow preferences regarding such services (Williams, 1971, as cited in Wood, 2006). 
Similarly, Carr, Gerber, and Lupher (2007) studied cooperation behaviors between 460 
Michigan local governments across 115 service categories using the 2005 Citizens Research 
Council of Michigan survey. Carr, Gerber, and Lupher (2007) found that stormwater 
management required medium capital intensiveness and high technical expertise, which led close 
to twenty-five percent of the study sample to conduct vertical (with the county government) 
ILAs to manage stormwater service as compared to approximately forty percent opting for in-
house production a nearly ten percent carrying out production through horizontal agreements. 
Carr, Gerber, and Lupher (2007) explained that the decision to join a vertical or horizontal 
service delivery agreement lay in cities’ financial ability to bear the burdens of capital-
intensiveness and specialized expertise cost. Since stormwater management has a high demand 
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for technical expertise, local governments with low fiscal capacity will tend to cooperate 
vertically with governments.  
In a more in-depth study of ten services from the same 2005 Citizens Research Council 
of Michigan survey, LeRoux and Carr (2007) specifically examined how stormwater 
management was impacted by economic factors (public works spending, intergovernmental 
revenues, per capita property, and per capita income) and local/regional characteristics 
(population, population change, population density, adjacent borders, population concentration in 
county), local demographic characteristics (population > 65, percentage population non-white), 
and Council of Governments (COG) membership. LeRoux and Carr (2007) found that economic 
factors, local demographic characteristics, and COG membership had no statistically significant 
impact on engagement in ILAs for stormwater management. However, LeRoux and Carr (2007) 
found that local/regional characteristics significantly impacted ILA engagement for stormwater 
management. According to LeRoux and Carr (2007), the adjacent borders variable had a 
statistically negative significant impact on ILA engagement for stormwater management, which 
contradicts the assumption of transaction cost theory that the presence of a large number of 
neighbors increases the likelihood of entering into cooperation.  
The ILA literature focusing on stormwater management issues lacks sufficient attention 
to the question of joining an ILA to comply with regulatory burdens. One of the reasons for this 
lack of attention is a perception of the specialization required for stormwater management. Both 
Carr, Gerber, and Lupher (2007) and LeRoux and Carr (2007) used the same 2005 Citizens 
Research Council of Michigan survey, in which the participants indicated that stormwater 
management required high technical expertise. However, LeRoux and Carr (2007) stated that the 
survey was conducted by “the city administrator or mayor, village manager or president, or 
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township supervisor” (p. 349). In other words, all the participants in the study were not 
specialists but rather provided their answers according to preconceived notions about the 
specialization of stormwater management. This lack of attention to stormwater management 
regulatory burden has created a mismatch between the explanatory theory (transaction cost) used 
by the ILA literature and the practice (joining an ILA for managing stormwater).  
 Stormwater Management within the Environmental Management Literature 
Environmental professionals may consider that compliance with regulatory burdens 
would limit their intentions to cooperate with other local governments. For example, Youm 
(2014) studied the impact of regulative burdens imposed by the federal governments (and states) 
on 315 local governments' decisions to enter into voluntary cooperative relationships to 
implement the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Block Grant program. Youm (2014) found 
that the compliance burden enforced by the federal government on local governments had a 
statistically negative significant impact on the local governments' decisions to enter into 
voluntary cooperative relationships to implement the program. In other words, the results 
indicated that the presence of legislative burdens reduced the desire to enter into cooperative 
relations. However, the cooperation between local governments in meeting stormwater 
regulatory burdens may have a positive impact. For example, Hoornbeek, Beechey, and 
Pascarella (2016) studied the effectiveness and efficiency of cooperation in eleven cities in Ohio 
to meet stormwater regulation (MS4) requirements. Hoornbeek, Beechey, and Pascarella (2016) 
reported that the participants (project managers in each city) in the study case stated that the 
cooperation contributed to meeting the legislative requirements in a short period of time in 
addition to providing an overall cost saving for all participants totaling nearly half a million 
dollars.  Thus, it can be said that there is a discrepancy between findings of the environmental 
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management literature on the issue of cooperation and compliance with regulatory burdens.  
Therefore, the gap in interlocal cooperation and environmental management literature has 
two aspects. The first aspect is related to the lack of attention to joining an ILA in order to 
comply with regulatory burdens on the part of both the holistic view of public works ILA studies 
and the specific focus on stormwater management ILAs studies, which leads to a mismatch 
between the explanatory theory (transaction cost theory) used by the ILA literature and the 
practice (ILA for managing stormwater). As a result of not including regulatory burdens as one 
reason for organizations to join ILAs, the current ILA literature does not discuss the factors 
influencing the RLGs’ decisions to join ILAs.  The other aspect relates to cooperation and 
compliance with regulative burdens in the environmental management literature is that there is a 
disagreement between this type of literature. Therefore, our study empirically examines factors 
affecting RLGs’ decisions to join ILAs, which will expand the interlocal cooperation and ILA 
literature beyond public service provision/delivery to create a link with regulatory burdens as a 
reason for joining an ILA. In other words, the current study explores the decisions of cities 
subject to regulatory burdens with respect to entering ILAs.  
4.3 The Proposed Theoretical Framework 
The transaction costs approach has been used to explain government decisions regarding 
the provision of services and their choices among the available alternatives to solve collective 
action problems (Feiock, 2013). According to Williamson (1981), entering into contractual 
relationships involves many complications associated with writing and enforcing contracts in 
light of the desire of the contracting parties to reduce their costs and achieve their interests. In 
other words, decisions regarding entering into contractual relationships include an additional cost 
that affects the total value of the contract, which is reflected in the cost of obtaining information 
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on preparing the contract, as well as linked to the monitoring cost associated with ensuring the 
enforcement of the contracting process. In addition, Williamson (1981) argued that the decision 
of whether to produce or purchase services through external contracting is related to the 
management of the cost of contracting and limiting factors that may increase the transaction cost, 
as a result of the lack of information and uncertainty. The information threat stems from the fact 
that the contracting parties will enter into a principal (contracting organization)-agent (vendor) 
relationship that is threatened by information asymmetry between the two; thus, the contracting 
parties need to research and negotiate the real price of the service, a process which increases the 
cost of contracting (Williamson, 1981). On the other hand, the uncertainty threat stems from the 
fact that the contract parties cannot determine all the circumstances surrounding the enforcement 
of the contract; thus, vendors or contractors may engage in opportunistic activities or behaviors, 
which would require directing sources to monitor the enforcement of the contracts, thus 
increasing the total cost of the contracts (Williamson, 1981). Therefore, transaction costs affect 
the cost savings associated with the process of providing services through outsourcing. 
During the nineties, there was great pressure on the government for New Public 
Management reforms to reduce costs by providing services through external contracting 
(Milward & Editor, 1996). In light of this pressure to cut costs, governments’ decisions regarding 
the internal provision of services or contracting them out (while preserving the ownership and 
liability associated with the service) were linked to a number of transaction cost risk factors, 
including service-specific characteristics, the degree of competition, and goal incongruence of 
the contracting parties (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Regarding the service-specific characteristics 
of the transaction cost risks factors, Brown and Potoski (2003) distinguished between two 
characteristics that could influence governments’ decision to produce services: service asset 
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specificity and service measurability. Service asset specificity is concerned with the degree to 
which specialized investments that cannot be transferred to other uses, which would create a 
monopoly for the first contract vendors due to the high start-up cost; thus, governments will 
prefer to provide these services internally (Brown & Potoski, 2003). By contrast, service 
measurability is concerned with measuring service performance, which will create an 
opportunity for the emergence of opportunistic behavior of the vendor if the service is difficult to 
measure (Brown & Potoski, 2003). In addition, the degree of competition between the service 
vendors represents another transaction cost risk factor. According to Brown and Potoski (2003), 
the contracting process becomes more efficient if there are a sufficient number of competing 
service providers because there being a sufficient number of competitors contributes to the 
revealing of information about the real price of the service in addition to the reduction of the cost 
of monitoring, as the service providers will be under threat of losing contracts in favor of other 
providers in the next contracting round if they do not adhere to the quality of implementation. 
Finally, the goal incongruence, as a transaction costs risks factor, is related to reducing the 
quality of contract implementation in the presence of information asymmetry dilemmas between 
the principal (contracting organization) and the agent (vendor); thus, governments will tend in 
favor of joint contracting with other governments if the service is characterized as highly asset-
specific or difficult to measure or if there is a limited (e.g., in non-competitive marketplaces) 
number of service providers (Brown & Potoski, 2003). Therefore, governments that aspire to 
save costs through contracting out service providers must consider factors that threaten to 
increase their transaction costs. 
With regard to stormwater management, the transaction cost approach has been utilized 
to explain government decision management internally, joint vertical agreement, or horizontal 
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agreement (Morgan, Hirlinger, & England, 1988; Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Wood, 2006; Carr, 
Gerber, & Lupher, 2007; LeRoux & Carr, 2007). However, the results of these studies differ 
regarding the transaction cost risk factors that impact the local government decisions on 
stormwater management. For example, in relation to service-specific characteristics and goal 
incongruence, both Wood (2006) and Carr, Gerber, and Lupher (2007) found that stormwater 
management is characterized as highly asset-specific and is not difficult to measure, which has 
led the local government to contract only with other governments or perform the functions 
internally. On the other hand, we find a lack of agreement about the impact of geographic 
location on the local governments’ decisions on stormwater management. Both Morgan, 
Hirlinger, and England (1988) and Morgan and Hirlinger (1991) related the geographic location 
of the local government to its ability to have a sufficient number of suppliers—that is, the 
existence of a competitive market for the service; specifically, the location of local governments 
within a Standard Metropolitan Area increases the opportunities for contracting out to provide 
stormwater management service. On the other hand, LeRoux and Carr (2007) found that an 
increase in the number of neighbors negatively affected decisions to join ILAs related to 
stormwater management, which contradicts assumptions regarding the impact of competition on 
transaction costs. Therefore, it is evident that decisions on stormwater management may be 
limited depending on whether the impact of the geographical location of the local government is 
positive or negative in relation to joining into contractual relationships for the implementation of 
services. 
Regarding the question of joining ILAs to comply with the stormwater regulatory burden, 
I argue that the geographical location of the local government has an impact on its decision to 
join contractual relations for the implementation of stormwater regulations. According to 
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Bowman and Kearney (2012), local governments have insufficient substantive authority to 
effectively comply with the devalued federal and state governments' program implementation 
responsibilities. The insufficient substantive authority in this regard concerns regulating or 
financing the implementation of the program (Bowman & Kearney, 2012). In other words, the 
regulatory burdens associated with the devalued policy implementation create legal 
responsibility for local governments without providing tools that harmonize the process of 
fulfilling this responsibility. Within the stormwater management regulative burdens, local 
governments face legal liability for implementing the imposed regulations even though 
stormwater can come from neighboring cities or sources not covered by the legislation (Dhakal 
& Chevalier, 2016). In addition, the decision to fund the implementation process, either through 
stormwater service fees or through general tax revenues, is considered to be of high political 
cost, as it is subject to the financing regulations followed in each state as well as to citizens 
inputs (Grigg, 2013). Since local governments are legally liable for implementing stormwater 
policies and are subject to a high political cost financing mechanism, they will more readily 
engage in cooperative behaviors that do not risk such liability. 
The transaction cost assumption regarding the positive impact of having access to a pool 
of competing service suppliers upon joining contractual relations offers a suitable lens for 
interpreting decisions to engage in cooperation between local governments to meet the regulatory 
burden imposed by the implementation of stormwater policies. According to Dhakal and 
Chevalier (2016), the sharing of hydrological boundaries necessitates cooperatively work in a 
hydrological unit to avoid negative externalities that may affect all members within this unit. 
Similarly, geographical position or geographical ties play a central role in local governments’ 
decisions to enter into a cooperative relationship. According to Post (2002), “local governments 
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generally cooperate with geographically proximate governments” (p. 43). In other words, 
neighboring local governments are likely to participate more in cooperative activities. In 
addition, Feiock (2007) argues that “[n]eighbors have incentives to cooperate based on the 
technical costs of sharing services” (p. 54). In other words, sharing geographical boundaries 
reduces the cost of service negotiating and delivery. Since complying with the regulatory 
requirements of stormwater management policies is a legal liability for regulated local 
governments, they will seek to reduce the cost of compliance by joint contracting with 
neighboring governments with whom they are sharing geographical boundaries; thus, I 
hypothesize the following: 
H1: An increase in the number of neighboring RLGs is associated with an increase in the 
likelihood of an RLG’s decision to join an ILA, all else equal. 
 
In addition, there is another factor that influences local government decisions regarding 
joining ILAs to comply with the stormwater regulatory burden: population density. The 
dispersion of population or population density increases the cost of providing public services 
(Ladd, 1992).  According to Ladd (1992), increases in population density require the 
concentration of services (police, garbage collection, traffic lights, etc.) in a specific area, while 
the cost is divided among the entire population, which creates diseconomies for the rest of the 
residents; thus, the local government will seek to reduce costs by searching for cooperation 
opportunities. Nevertheless, in the area of stormwater management, population density is one of 
the reasons for the problem (Baker, 2009b). When people cluster in cities, there will be an 
increase in urban areas within those cities; thus, the risks associated with stormwater 
management will increase. Leroux and Carr (2007) found that population density had a 
significant statistical effect on the decision to cooperate in stormwater management, which 
creates the connection between population density and stormwater management. Therefore, 
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regarding local government decisions to join ILAs in order to comply with the stormwater 
regulatory burden, I hypothesize the following: 
H2: An increase in the population density is associated with an increase in the likelihood 
of the RLGs’ decisions to join ILAs, all else equal. 
 
Finally, the following section provides details about the case study, along with the 
research data and methodology. 
4.4 Research Design 
To test our research hypotheses, we conducted a study with a cross-sectional design to 
analyze a case study, and our unit of analysis was the MS4 city. Our case study included all the 
cities subjected to MS4 permits within the Dallas–Fort Worth (DFW) region in Texas. According 
to the TCEQ (n.d.), there are 119 cities subjected to MS4 permits, out of 224 cities in the state, in 
the DFW region. Moreover, seven cities are MS4 Phase I, representing half of the Phase I cities 
in Texas, and 113 cities are MS4 Phase II, representing about one-third of the MS4 Phase II 
cities in the state.  Besides representing a sufficient number of RLGs, the cities within the DFW 
region feature disparities in size and nature in their populations and economic activity. 
Moreover, the DFW region has diverse institutional arrangements, which include the North 
Central Texas Council of Governments (NCTCOG)—the “second-largest metropolitan planning 
area in the nation” (NCTCOG, 2017). More importantly, the NCTCOG is the only regional 
organization in the state of Texas that provides a stormwater management program.  
The NCTCOG stormwater management program is managed by the Regional Stormwater 
Management Coordinating Council (RSWMCC). The RSWMCC is responsible for forming an 
annual plan to address “state and federal stormwater quality regulations” (NCTCOG, n.d.). 
Moreover, the RSWMCC offers an annual contract to help the MS4 cities to comply with the 
MS4 permit requirements. Under this contract, the Phase I cities are responsible for the regional 
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cooperative monitoring of the TCEQ permit (NCTCOG, n.d.). With this diversity among cities 
and the availability of many institutional arrangements, the DFW region is well-suited for this 
study. 
Table 4.1: Description of Measurements and Data Sources 
Variables Measurements Data Sources 
Dependent Variable 
MS4 ILA Codded 1 if the MS4 city was a member of the MS4 ILA in 2017, 0 otherwise. NCTCOG 
Independent Variable 
Neighboring 
Number  Number of neighboring cities. NCTCOG 
Population 







The natural log of per capita income in 2016 U.S. Census Bureau 
Public Works 
Spending 
Percent of spending on public works from the total budget in 
2016 Cities’ websites 
Stormwater 
Fee 
A dichotomous variable coded one if the local government in 
2016 had a stormwater fee or zero otherwise Cities’ websites 
Government 
Type 
A dichotomous variable coded one if the local government in 





Percent of residents who were 65 old or older within the 




In sum, the data used in this study were collected from two sources, the TCEQ website, 
and NCTCOG records. First, we reviewed the TCEQ website to identify all MS4 cities in the 
DFW region and their types. Second, NCTCOG records were reviewed, and the data on MS4 
cities that were members of NCTCOG was collected. NCTCOG records also include data on the 
members of their 2017 MS4 ILA. Therefore, our final sample included all the 119 MS4 cities in 
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the DFW region, 97 of these cities being NCTCOG members, and the study period was the year 
2017.  
4.4.1 The Dependent Variable 
Following Morgan and Hirlinger (1991), the dependent variable was joining the MS4 
ILA. It was measured by one dummy variable (coded One if MS4 city was a member of the MS4 
ILA, zero otherwise). This measure was consistent with the nature of the phenomenon under 
study, as there were no inconsistent demands for membership or other attributes of membership. 
The cities either decided to join the ILA or not to join.  Therefore, this measure captured the 
MS4 city decision to join the ILA.   
4.4.2 Independent Variables 
The first independent variable is the total number of neighboring cities, operationalized 
as having shared boundaries with MS4. In addition, we measured the shared boundaries 
according to the administrative boundaries provided by the Texas Department of Transportation 
(n.d.), which is a corresponding measurement of the geographical location of the cities with 
stormwater literature (Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; LeRoux & Carr, 2007). With data on 
geographical boundaries, it was easy to build a measurement based on the number of neighbors. 
The number of miles that separate a city from its central urban city would not have added any 
value to this study; thus, the employed measure of the geographical location served the study's 
objectives. In addition, LeRoux and Carr (2007) used a similar method of measuring the number 
of neighboring cities; thus, this study’s operationalization of the total number of neighboring 
cities was in line with the literature.  
The second control variable is Population Density, which measured the number of 
persons per square mile in a unit in 2016. This measurement is consistent with local agreement 
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literature exploring the effect of this factor upon entry into cooperative relations among local 
governments (Ladd, 1992; Leroux & Carr, 2007; Kwon, & Feiock, 2010; Andrew, Short, Jung, 
& Arlikatti, 2015). As stated previously, the cost of providing public service would be expected 
to increase with increases in population density. Therefore, the population density variable was 
used to test my third hypothesis. 
4.4.3 Control Variables  
The first control variable is the Community Wealth, which was measured by per capita 
income in 2016. The variable could affect the city's ability to join a regional organization or enter 
an ILA (Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991; Leroux & Carr, 2007). Specifically, Morgan and Hirlinger 
(1991) found that there was a negative nonlinear relationship between community wealth and the 
decision of the local government to join an ILA; thus, as the community wealth increases, the 
likelihood of joining an ILA is expected to decrease, but after subsequent increases in 
community wealth, governments will seek to join an ILA. In other words, wealthy communities 
will be more willing to join an ILA. Similarly, Leroux and Carr (2007) found similar findings 
regarding the nonlinear relationship between community wealth and the decision of the local 
government to join the ILA. Leroux and Carr (2007) stated that “[t]his tendency toward 
cooperation disappears as community wealth increases but reemerges among very wealthy 
communities” (p. 352); thus, the nonlinear relationship was conformed. However, after 
conducting a meta-regression analysis based on approximately 50 empirical articles about 
cooperation, Bel and Warner (2016) concluded that the community wealth effect is not fully 
known. Some studies have found that wealthy communities will not seek cooperation since they 
do not experience economic pressure. Given the variations in the effect of this factor, this study 
will use the log of per capita income in 2016 to ensure that the community wealth effect is not 
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affected by the variation of the per capita income within the data.   
The second control variable is Public Works Spending, measured by the percent of 
spending on public works from the total budget in 2016. According to Morgan and Hirlinger 
(1991), the amount of spending on public works indicates the extent of financial pressure on the 
local government, which can lead them to adopt alternatives to reduce public works service costs 
(stormwater management often falls under the public works department). Nevertheless, Leroux 
and Carr (2007) pointed out that spending on public works may not be of direct benefit to 
political leaders in local governments because it is less visible to the population as compared to 
other services that they can claim credit for, such as public safety; thus, political leaders in local 
government will look for ways to redirect the resources from public works to other more visible 
services. In other words, political leaders are motivated to reduce the cost of public works 
services in comparison to other services. Therefore, this study includes a control variable that 
measures the impact of the volume of spending on public works on the decision of local 
governments to join an interlocal agreement for stormwater management.  
The third control variable is whether there is a Stormwater Fee assessed by the local 
government, measured by one dichotomous variable coded one if the local government in 2016 
had a stormwater fee or zero otherwise. According to Grigg (2013), stormwater management has 
become complicated because it includes a number of services, including “storm drainage, water 
quality, mitigation of land-use impacts, floodplain management, and open space amenities” (p. 
6). In addition, Grigg (2013) points out that the imposed unfunded stormwater mandate has 
moved stormwater management from being a pure public good (non-excludable and non-
rivalrous, e.g., rainwater collecting and draining) to become a public good utility in which 
customers are charged to access the stormwater services. However, Grigg (2013) stated that the 
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practice of charging a fee for stormwater faces questions about this utility’s measurability and 
the rationales for the charging schemes; thus, for this study, local governments were divided in 
the area of financing stormwater management into two models: the first engaged in financing 
through taxes, and the other engaged in financing through service fees. Campbell (2020) 
identified and recoded all information about stormwater utility implementation in local 
governments since the Western Kentucky University Stormwater Utility Survey 2010. It was 
found that there were more than 1,800 cities imposing stormwater service charges in 41 states. 
Further, Campbell (2020) found that Texas had more than 120 cities that imposed stormwater 
utility fees. According to Zhao, Fonseca, and Zeerak (2019), there is no agreement on the extent 
to which stormwater utility fees can meet all the financial burdens associated with implementing 
stormwater quality mandates. On the one hand, the fees may be sufficient to meet the financial 
need and thus to meet the legislative burdens (Zhao, Fonseca, & Zeerak, 2019). On the other 
hand, there are many legal restrictions on the ability of local governments to impose such fees 
(Campbell, 2020). Therefore, the necessity of having a stormwater fee may dissuade local 
governments from entering into a local agreement to meet legislative burdens or contribute to 
funding to enter into a local agreement to meet those burdens; thus, the Stormwater Fee variable 
controls for the potential effect of stormwater utility fees. 
The fourth control variable is the Government Type, measured by one dummy variable 
coded one if the local government in 2016 had a council-manager form of government or zero 
otherwise. According to Andrew (2009), the form of government as a factor that influences the 
decision of local governments regarding inter-jurisdictional interaction has received “compelling 
arguments” in that professionals (as compared to elected leaders) are more motivated to enter 
into such relationships because they aspire to enhance their career gains in the long term as 
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argued by Stein (1990 as cited in Andrew, 2009). Such arguments regarding the professional’s 
motivation to enter into inter-jurisdictional interactions were evidenced by literature such as 
(LeRoux 2006, as cited in Andrew, 2009), Feiock (2007, as cited in Andrew, 2009), and Krueger 
and McGuire (2005). However, another stream of literature argues that the influence of the type 
of local government leadership on the decision to enter into cooperative relationships is related to 
the type of service for which the mayor-council form of government will seek cooperative 
relationships in visible political functions like economic development, and council-manager form 
of government will seek cooperative relationships in visible functions that are routine services 
(Kwon, & Feiock, 2010; Shrestha, & Feiock, 2011; Hawkins, 2017). Given that stormwater 
management and the meeting of legislative burdens are less attractive to the attention of 
politicians (Zhao, Fonseca, & Zeerak, 2019), it can be said that stormwater management may fall 
under the category of routine services. Therefore, this study controls for the impact of the form 
of government on the decisions of local governments to enter into an ILA to meet the legislative 
burdens of stormwater management.  
The fifth control variable is related to social homogeneity. According to Morgan and 
Hirlinger (1991), the vulnerable groups in society are the ones most accustomed to the services 
provided by local governments; thus, decisions to reduce the cost of services provided by these 
governments may be affected by the size of this population group, which include the Older 
Population. Moreover, members of the senior population (age 65+) are more active in politics 
than younger individuals and may have a role in influencing local governments’ decisions to 
enter into cooperative relationships (Morgan & Hirlinger, 1991); thus, the final control variable 
is the size of the Older Population, which is measured by the percentage of residents who were of 
age 65 or older within the population in 2016. LeRoux, Brandenburger, and Pandey (2010) found 
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that the senior population had a significant statistical effect on local governments’ decisions to 
enter into ILAs; therefore, I control for this variable in this study.  
Besides the controlling variables of this study, which represent the greatest potential 
impacts on the study issue (meeting the stormwater management requirements), I did not control 
for numerous variables that may impact cooperation decisions among local governments. These 
variables would include organizational factors or service level transaction costs. Bel and Warner 
(2016) found that such variables were statistically significant only approximately 40% of the 
time in the studies that they reviewed. Therefore, including more control variables would not 
have been beneficial for this study.   
4.4.4 Data Analysis 
Since this study uses a binary response measurement for our dependent variable, logistic 
regression is used to analyze our data. According to Agresti (2007), logistic regression is used to 
analyze a nonlinear relationship that takes the S-shaped curves function, which is used to 
estimate probabilities of success or failure of outcomes within a binomial distribution. In other 
words, it shows the odds of one event occurring against the other. The logistic regression 
predicts the logarithm of the odds scale, which often transfers to odds ratios or predicted 
probabilities, increases the dependent variable every for a one-unit increase in the independent 
variable (Agresti, 2007). Therefore, the mathematical expression for this study’s logistic 
regression is as follows: 
𝐸𝐸�𝑌𝑌� = 1�𝑋𝑋𝑖𝑖� = 𝑎𝑎 +  𝛽𝛽1(Neighboring Number )
+ 𝛽𝛽2(Population Density) + 𝛽𝛽3(Log Community wealth)
+ 𝛽𝛽4(Public Works Spending) + 𝛽𝛽5(Stormwater Fee)
+ 𝛽𝛽6(Government Type) + 𝛽𝛽7(Older Population) + 𝑒𝑒 
 
According to Frankfort-Nachmias and Nachmias (2007), a cross-sectional design increases a 
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study's external validity because it does not require random assignment for the individuals who 
are participating in the study. In addition, this design limits the internal validity of the study. 
Therefore, there are a high chance of heteroscedasticity (having an equal residual variance at 
each level of the predictor) issues, which may not be a problem with binary logistic regression; 
however, residuals should be standardized in logistic regression (Menard, 2010).  
Multicollinearity (a high correlation between independent variables) is also a problem 
that affects the hypotheses’ test results (Midi, Sarkar, & Rana, 2010). As the correlation between 
the independent variables increases, it becomes difficult to differentiate the individual effects of 
the independent variables on the dependent variable (Menard, 2010). Therefore, I used a 
correlation matrix to test for any potential multicollinearity among my independent variables, as 
shown in Table 4.2.  
4.5 Results and Discussion 
4.5.1 Results 
Based on the results of the descriptive analysis presented in Table 4.2, it can be seen that 
there is some dispersion with the data. For example, the number of neighboring cities varies 
between 0 to 25 cities with a mean for this variable of 3.58; thus, on average, each city within the 
sample had about four neighboring cities. This discrepancy can be attributed to the fact that 
suburban cities are spread among the region's major cities, such as Dallas and Fort Worth. 
Concerning population density, we found that the average was about 1,888 people per square 
mile. The lower density was recorded at 109.20 people per square mile, and the highest density 
was recorded at 7183.10 people per square mile. According to the United States Census Bureau 
(2015), the average population density at the United States level is 90 people per square mile, but 
this varies according to the urbanization progress in different regions: the greater the urban level, 
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the greater the population density.  
Table 4.2: Variables’ Descriptive Statistics (N = 119) 
Variable Mean SD Min Value Max Value 
MS4 ILA .43 .50 0 1 
Neighboring Number 3.58 3.33 0 26 
Population Density 1887.98 1380.84 109.20 7183.10 
Community Wealth 38094.29 22244.81 2345 146644 
Public Works Spending 27.10 14.07 2.54 96.46 
Stormwater Fee (Having a fee=1)>a .43 .50 0 1 
Government Type (Council – 
Manager=1)>b .77 .42 0 1 
Older Population (65+ old) 11.77 4.97 4.20 33.40 
a<Not having a fee> is the reference group. b<Mayor- Council> is the reference group. 
 
The average per capita income for people within the cities sampled was about thirty-eight 
thousand dollars, which was higher than the thirty-one thousand dollars average per capita 
income for people within the state of Texas (United States Census Bureau, 2019). Regarding 
spending on public works, the average spending of about 27.10% of the total budget was not 
surprising because public works may account for 25% of local government expenditures (Urban 
Institute, n.d). Therefore, the descriptive analysis results indicated that the study sample might 
include some dispersion, supporting the decision to take the natural log for the Community 
wealth variable. Thus, the Robust function in Stata was used to control for any potential 
heteroscedasticity issues.  
The correlation matrix in Table 4.3 makes it clear that multicollinearity does not exist 
since the Pearson correlations of all variables range from .429 to -.002, which indicates that there 
is no high correlation between the study’s independent variables. In addition, the Neighboring 
Number, Population Density, Log Community wealth, Stormwater Fee, Government Type, and 
Older Population variables are positively correlated with the dependent variable.  
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Table 4.3: The Correlation Matrix (N = 119) 















MS4 ILA 1        
Neighboring Number .397 1       
Population Density .364 .225 1      
Community wealth 




.002 -.100 -.122 .035 1    
Stormwater Fee 
(Having a fee=1)>a .382 .361 .429 .043 -.015 1   
Government Type 
(Council – Manager 
=1)>b 
.429 .270 .189 .101 .132 .388 1  
Older Population (65+ 
old) -.052 -.184 -.156 .238 -.002 -.095 -.042 1 
a<Not having a fee> is the reference group. b<Mayor- Council> is the reference group. 
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However, the Older Population variable is negatively correlated, which is in line with the 
expectation for this variable. Although Public Works Spending is positively correlated with the 
dependent variable, the correlation is close to zero (.002), indicating no correlation between the 
Public Works Spending variable and this study’s dependent variable. The Hosmer-Lemeshow 
test was used to determine the goodness of fit of the study model. According to Hosmer Jr., 
Lemeshow, and Sturdivant (2013), the Hosmer-Lemeshow test is used to test how the observed 
outcome rates would match the expected outcome rates in population subgroups (usually ten 
groups). The Hosmer-Lemeshow test was 5.27 (df= 8, p= .70), which indicates that the model 
seems to fit the data well since the expected observed frequencies are above five. The model 
correctly predicts the data 77.31% compared to not using the model. In addition, the overall 
model chi-square is statistically significant (df= 7, p< .001); thus, it can be concluded that the 
logistic regression model fits the study data.  
The logistic regression analysis was conducted to investigate the impact of the number of 
neighboring cities (M = 3.58, SD = 3.328), the population density (M = 1887.98, SD = 1380.84), 
the community wealth (M = 38094.29, SD = 22244.81), the public works spending (M = 27.10, 
SD = 14.07), the stormwater fee (M = .43, SD = .50), the government type (M = .77, SD = .42), 
and the older population (M = 11.77, SD = 4.97) on the decision of the local government to enter 
into an inter-local agreement—MS4 ILA (M = .43, SD = .50) to meet the legislative burdens 
related to stormwater management. Table 5.4 reports the results of the logistic regression, which 
indicate that there were some significant associations between the number of neighboring cities, 
the population density, the community wealth, the public works spending, the stormwater fee, 
the government type, the percentage of the older population, and the decision of the MS4 city to 
enter into MS4 ILA (χ2(7) = 34.30, p < .001). All predictor variables were tested a priori to 
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verify that there was no violation of the assumption of the linearity of the logit. The number of 
neighboring cities, the population density, and the government type in the logistic regression 
analysis were statistically significant predictors of the decision of the MS4 city to enter into an 
MS4 ILA. The unstandardized Beta weight for the Constant was B= -11.402, SE= 5.006, p < .05. 
The unstandardized Beta weight for the number of neighboring cities variable: B= .382, SE= 
.141, p < 0.05. The estimated odds ratio favorite increase of nearly 46.5% [Exp (B)= 1.465, 95% 
CI (.105, .660)] for MS4 ILA every one city increases of the number of neighboring cities. The 
unstandardized Beta weight for the population density variable: B= .001, SE= .001, p < 0.05. The 
estimated odds ratio favorite increase of nearly 0.1% [Exp (B)= 1.001, 95% CI (.001, .008)] for 
MS4 ILA every one person per square mile increases of population density. The unstandardized 
Beta weight for the government type cities variable; B= 2.580, SE= 1.166, p < 0.05. The 
estimated odds ratio favorite increases by nearly 1230.2% [Exp (B)= 13.302, 95% CI (.297, 
4.878)] for MS4 ILA transition from a mayor-council system to a council-manager system. 
Table 4.4: Logistic Regressions Results (N = 119) 
Variable 
MS4 ILA 











Community wealth (Log transformed) 1.354 (1.159) 
3.875 
(287.4%) 
Public Works Spending (Log transformed) .003 (.016) 
1.003 
(0.3%) 





Government Type (Council – Manager =1)>b 2.580* (1.168) 
13.302 
(1230.2%) 











Pseudo R² 0.333 
-2 Log Likelihood -54.187 
Model Χ2 34.30*** 
Hosmer-Lemeshow Χ2  test 5.47 
% correctly predicted with the model 77.31 
Model Degrees of Freedom 7 
Note: B (SE) = unstandardized estimate of the logistic regression coefficient (and its standard error).  
a<Not having a fee> is the reference group. b<Mayor- Council> is the reference group. ***p ≤ 0.001, **p ≤ 
0.01, *p ≤ 0.05 (two-tailed tests) 
 
4.5.2 Discussion 
The logistic regression analysis results supported both of this study's hypotheses. The 
analysis results indicated statistically significant evidence supporting the hypothesis regarding 
the impact of the number of neighboring cities on the MS4 cities’ decisions to join inter-local 
agreements to meet the legislative burdens associated with stormwater management legislation. 
As shown in Figure 4.1, the average predicted probability of joining an MS4 ILA by an MS4 city 
increased as neighboring cities increased. These results are consistent with the transaction cost 
argument regarding the positive impact of having a supply of alternative providers on local 
governments' decisions to enter into inter-local agreements to provide the service (Brown & 
Potoski, 2003). Similarly, this study’s finding is consistent with Morgan and Hirlinger's (1991) 
finding that having access to alternative providers increases the likelihood of joining inter-local 
agreements. 
On the other hand, the result of this study is at odds with Post's (2002) conclusion that 
alternative service providers may not be important, as this study demonstrates it is an important 
predictor variable. The results of this study indicate that having access to alternative providers 
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increases the likelihood of joining the inter-local agreements, which conflicts with the results of 
LeRoux and Carr (2007), who found that having access to alternative providers decreases the 
likelihood of joining inter-local agreements for stormwater management. The change in the 
direction of the impact of this variable can be attributed to the fact that stormwater management 
legislation has expanded during the past years, which may have created an urgent need to meet 
legislative burdens through local agreements. Therefore, the study results support the hypothesis 
that an increase in the number of neighboring cities increases the likelihood of entering into 
cooperative relationships to meet the requirements of the legislative burdens of stormwater 
management. 
Figure 4.1: Predicted Probabilities of Joining MS4 ILA by the Total Number of Neighboring Cities 
 
 
Regarding population density, the results of this study indicate that there is statistically 
significant evidence supporting the hypothesis about the impact of population density on an MS4 
city's decision to join an inter-local agreement to meet the legislative burdens associated with 
117 
stormwater management legislation. As shown in Figure 4.2, the average predicted probability of 
an MS4 city’s joining MS4 ILA increases as the population density increases. While LeRoux and 
Carr (2007) stated that population density is related to inter-local cooperation on water and sewer 
utilities, it was found in the current study to be a statistically significant predictor of inter-local 
cooperation on stormwater management. Similarly, this study found that population density had 
a statistically positive significant impact on an MS4 city's decision to join an inter-local 
agreement to meet the legislative burdens associated with stormwater management legislation. 
This result can be attributed to the fact that population density reflects one of the sources of the 
stormwater pollution problem; thus, the greater the population density, the more urban 
construction, which means the city would be more subjected to the implementation of 
stormwater legislation by local governments. Therefore, the study results support the hypothesis 
that an increase in the population density increases the likelihood of entering into cooperative 
relationships to meet the requirements of the legislative burdens of stormwater management. 




Figure 4.3: Predicted Probabilities of Joining MS4 ILA by Government Type 
 
 
Among all the control variables, the form of government variable is the only one with 
statistical significance. As shown in Figure 4.3, the average predicted probability of  MS4 city’s 
joining MS4 ILA increases as the city moves from a Mayor-Council to a Council-Manager form 
of government. The study results are consistent with the results of previous studies (Krueger & 
McGuire, 2005; Kwon & Feiock, 2010; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011; Hawkins, 2017); it was found 
that managers are leaders in local cooperatives, especially in routine services. These results can 
be attributed to the fact that the process of meeting the requirements of the legislative burdens of 
stormwater management has become a routine matter for local governments, given that these 
legislations have been introduced and implemented for nearly three decades. Therefore, it is no 
surprise that the type of government positively impacts an MS4 city's decision to join an inter-
local agreement to meet the legislative burdens associated with stormwater management 
legislation. On the other hand, it is surprising that the social homogeneity (Older Population) and 
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financial (Community Wealth, Public Works Spending, and Stormwater Fee) variables had no 
effect on an MS4 city's decision to join an inter-local agreement to meet the legislative burdens 
associated with stormwater management legislation. These results can be explained by the fact 
that the response to the stormwater legislation requires an exchange of information and 
experiences among local governments, in addition to financial burdens. In other words, the desire 
to obtain information and expertise may be one reason for entering into such contracts besides 
reducing the cost of compliance. Therefore, these potential drivers should be investigated in 
future studies. 
4.6 Conclusion 
This research aimed to capture local governments’ use of interlocal agreements to comply 
with stormwater regulatory burdens imposed by federal and state policies. Two gaps were 
identified in the research literature: the lack of attention by interlocal cooperation literature to the 
factors influencing an RLG's decision to join an ILA to comply with regulatory burdens and the 
disagreement in the environmental management literature regarding compliance with the 
regulative burdens. In addition, the study hypothesized that an RLG would be more likely to take 
advantage of an interlocal agreement to comply with stormwater regulatory burdens if the 
number of neighboring cities and population density increases. Utilizing a case study of 119 
cities that were subjected to MS4 permits within the Dallas–Fort Worth (DFW) region in the 
state of Texas, the study found statistically significant evidence to support its hypotheses, as well 
as statistically significant evidence for the role of government type on such decisions. These 
results represent an addition to the current theoretical work on interlocal cooperation by 
accounting for regulatory burdens as a factor leading to inter-local agreements.  In addition, this 
paper will offer practitioners the opportunity to harness the power of local cooperative 
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relationships to address the regulatory burdens imposed on them by the federal and state 
governments. Finally, these papers provide a basis for researchers wishing to examine the 
relationship between regulatory burdens and local cooperation. 
In addition, I am aware that the use of a case study limits the generalizability of the 
findings. In other words, the findings may not be generalizable to other places or different types 
of regulatory burdens. However, the MS4 regulations affect thousands of local governments. 
Conceivably, an increase in the number of cases and the size of the sample may increase the 
generalizability of findings. However, this study provides an overall inroad to the study of 
regulatory burdens as a source of interlocal cooperation beyond service delivery and of the 
broker role of the regional organizations in the ILA. 
Finally, future research on the regulatory burdens as a source of interlocal cooperation in 
stormwater management should focus on other motivations associated with the contracting 
process, such as access to information and expertise. In addition, future research on meeting the 
legislative burdens associated with stormwater management should examine the role that the 
classification of cities plays in cooperative relationships and whether or not the Phase I cities are 
drivers of such engagements. All in all, future research may find this study to be a bridge 






This dissertation aimed to offer an inclusive conceptualization of a multilevel governance 
framework that accounts for the complexities of implementing stormwater management policies. 
Stormwater management is one of the most important collective action dilemma problems 
because everyone will be affected by a wide range of negative externalities if no one stops the 
pollution of stormwater or everyone focuses on moving stormwater outside their boundaries 
quickly and untreated. Moreover, stormwater pollution has direct impacts on both the 
environment and society. According to the USEPA (2017), 46% of the nation’s rivers/streams 
and 21% of its lakes are in poor condition due to stormwater and other pollution sources such as 
agriculture and urban development. Similarly, stormwater pollution impacts society by limiting 
the benefits of water used for drinking water or recreational activities. Also, stormwater can 
increase the chances of flooding and property damage.  
One of the most important sources of stormwater pollution is urban development. The 
process of urban development affects the environment and changes the stormwater streams. In 
addition, stormwater has led to the transport of urban waste from chemicals or solid materials; 
thus, the failure to treat rainwater leads to the pollution of water bodies. Given this unusual 
transformation of natural stormwater, there have been many types of responses to this issue at a 
number of levels of government. At the local government level, the response has often revolved 
around moving stormwater outside the administrative boundaries as quickly as possible, leading 
to increased water flow in neighboring local governments. Further, state governments have not 
often interfered in the process of rainwater management. Finally, the federal government has 
included legislative requirements for rainwater management, embodied by Section 319 of the 
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Clean Water Act of 1987, which establishes a new NPDES permit requirement, the MS4. 
To investigate the implementation of stormwater management regulations, this study 
builds on the literature on institutional fragmentation to create a theoretical framework for the 
proposed multilevel governance framework. This study has argued that stormwater management 
is fragmented both vertically (at the level of intergovernmental relations) and horizontally 
(within the level of governments). In terms of vertical fragmentation, there is conflict over the 
institutional setup that states follow in implementing stormwater policies after they assume the 
authority for their implementation. In the race to the bottom literature, there is an ongoing debate 
about the extent to which an institutional arrangement affects environmental policy outcomes. 
On the one hand, some argue that states will introduce a decentralizing framework to enhance 
competitiveness and reduce the impact of legislation on the economy. On the other hand, some 
argue that states will adopt a central framework that will enable them to achieve the desired 
policy results (increasing water quality). In the area of horizontal fragmentation, the 
requirements imposed by the stormwater management policy represent a regulatory burden on 
local governments since it requires collective action to reduce the cost of implementation first 
and then reduce the consequences of non-compliance by some other local governments. 
Therefore, this study introduced overall conceptualization of a multilevel governance 
framework that accounts for the complexities associated with implementing stormwater 
management policies at the vertical and horizontal levels by seeking an answer to the following 
questions: 
Q1: How do the institutional arrangements adopted to implement stormwater policies 
influence variation in stormwater quality at the state level? 
 
Q2: What influences variation in ILA membership for stormwater regulatory compliance 
at the regional level? 
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Each question has been discussed through an independent research paper. The first deals 
with the implementation of stormwater management policies at the vertical level. This paper 
investigates the effect of institutional arrangements adopted by state governments to deal with 
stormwater quality in these states. The second paper discusses the cooperation between local 
governments to comply with federal/state stormwater management policies at the horizontal 
level. This paper investigates the factors that motivate local governments subject to stormwater 
regulations to enter into cooperative relations to meet the legal requirements imposed on them by 
state/federal governments. The proposed conceptual framework aids in understanding the 
complexities of implementing stormwater management policies at the vertical and horizontal 
levels. 
5.1 Results and Implications 
The results of this thesis are presented in chapter 3 and chapter 4. Chapter 3 includes the 
qualitative study of the institutional arrangements adopted by the state governments to 
implement stormwater management policies. Through a review of the research literature related 
to the implementation of stormwater management policies, two main gaps were identified: the 
first gap is centered around the failure to address the impact of the institutional arrangements 
adopted by the states, and the second gap is centered around the limited generalizability of single 
case studies. Building on the theory of local public economics and the race to the bottom 
literature, chapter 4 presents a qualitative study to address the gaps identified in the research 
literature. The qualitative study reviewed stormwater drainage permits (MS4 permits) and 
stormwater quality reports in four case studies: California, Texas, Virginia, and Minnesota. The 
study found that stormwater quality is affected by the institutional framework used to implement 
stormwater management policies. Specifically, the study found that the stormwater quality 
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increases as a result of the adoption of decentralized policies in the areas of standard 
formalization, coercion action, education, staff training requirements, local government 
contextual prioritization, and accommodation for opinions of other stakeholders at the local and 
regional levels. The study also found that the higher the degree of centralization in any of these 
dimensions, the lower the stormwater quality. In other words, there is an inverse relationship 
between the quality of stormwater and the degree of centralization in the adopted institutional 
arrangements for the implementation of stormwater management policies by state governments. 
The qualitative study results presented in chapter 4 are consistent with findings from the 
literature that deals with the positive impacts of decentralization on environmental policies. This 
result is consistent with Oates and Portney’s (2003) proposition that local governments should be 
given a degree of autonomy in implementing environmental legislation to match their local needs 
with the legislative requirements imposed on them by state/federal governments. In addition, the 
current study finds that decentralization did not have negative results. On the contrary, it 
contributed to achieving the objectives of the legislation in reducing pollution levels in 
stormwater. Thus, these findings support Sigman’s (2014) findings regarding the positive effects 
of decentralization on policy implementation and contradict Millimet's (2013) argument 
regarding the negative consequences of decentralization. 
Concerning the horizontal aspect, chapter 4 presents a quantitative study of the factors 
that influence the decisions of local governments bound by stormwater regulations to enter into 
cooperative relationships. Based on a review of the cooperation and stormwater management 
literature, it was determined that there are two gaps in this literature: the lack of attention to the 
issue of joining an ILA to comply with regulatory burdens and disagreement within the 
environmental management literature regarding dealing with the stormwater regulatory burdens. 
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Employing transaction cost theory to address these literature gaps, the quantitative study tested 
two hypotheses, the first related to the number of local governments adjacent within the 
geographical area of the regulated local government and the second related to the population 
density of the regulated local government. Using a logistic regression model to analyze a case 
study of 119 cities subjected to MS4 permits within the Dallas–Fort Worth (DFW) region in 
Texas, the quantitative study results show that an increase in the number of neighboring 
regulated local governments is associated with an increase in the likelihood that the regulated 
local government will decide to join an ILA, as well as demonstrating that an increase in the 
population density is associated with an increase in the likelihood of a regulated local 
government’s deciding to join an ILA. In other words, the results of the study support the 
proposed hypotheses. In addition, the study found that the type of government also affects the 
decision to enter into a cooperative relationship to meet the regulatory burdens associated with 
implementing stormwater management policies imposed by state/federal governments. 
The quantitative study’s findings are in contrast to Morgan and Hirlinger's (1991) 
findings that having access to alternative providers increases the likelihood of joining an inter-
local agreement. In addition, the results are at odds with LeRoux and Carr's (2007) findings that 
having access to alternative providers decreases the likelihood of joining inter-local agreements. 
On the other hand, the current study results agree with those of LeRoux and Carr's (2007) study 
on the effect of the population density variable as both studies found that the higher the 
population density, the higher the probability that an organization will engage in cooperative 
relationships. The study results regarding the effect of the type of government variable are 
consistent with the results of previous studies (e.g., Krueger & McGuire, 2005; Kwon & Feiock, 
2010; Shrestha & Feiock, 2011; Hawkins, 2017); it was found that managers are leaders in local 
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cooperatives, especially in regard to routine services.  
This dissertation calls on local government workers in sectors involved in implementing 
environmental policies and stormwater management policies to understand the institutional 
framework in which they work and the potential cooperative relations available at the horizontal 
level to achieve the required compliance with these policies. By knowing how centralized or 
decentralized the institutional arrangements in which local government officials operate are, they 
can align legislative requirements with the needs of their citizens. In addition, local government 
employees should be aware that neighboring local governments can be a resource enabling them 
to ease the burden of compliance with legislation imposed by state/federal governments. 
Combining the understanding of the institutional arrangements with horizontal cooperative 
opportunities will enable the local governments to achieve the required compliance and meet 
their citizens’ needs. Ultimately, the policymaker at the state level should recognize that 
stormwater quality will be improved through the adoption of more decentralized institutional 
arrangements that allow local governments to align their citizens’ needs with regulative 
requirements. 
5.2 Contributions 
Providing a conceptualization of a multilevel governance framework for understanding 
the implementation of public policies is one of the main contributions of this dissertation. The 
multilevel governance framework encompasses the vertical and the horizontal aspects of public 
policy implementation. With regard to the vertical aspects, this dissertation contributes to the 
research literature by presenting a detailed methodology for studying the adoption of institutional 
arrangements by states to implement public policies after assuming the authority to implement 
them. The use of the qualitative approach to analyze and compare institutional arrangements 
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contributes to highlighting various aspects of the implementation of public policies, such as the 
discrepancy in the formulation of standards, the use of coercive power, the educational and 
training needs of those involved in implementation, and the importance of taking into account 
the differences between local governments and the opinions of local and regional stakeholders. 
Each of these aspects cannot be understood in depth through quantitative methods. However, 
qualitative methods are sufficient to increase the understanding of this discrepancy in the 
institutional arrangements for implementing public policies, especially rainwater management 
policies. 
Moreover, studying the horizontal aspects of the public policy implementation creates a 
bridge between the literature on cooperation between local governments and the literature 
interested in studying regulative burdens. By examining the factors that influence the decisions 
of the regulated local governments to enter into cooperative relationships to meet regulative 
burdens, this study provides new scope for the study of cooperative relationships outside the 
context of public service delivery. In other words, this work moves the study of cooperation 
between local governments from a framework of cooperation to provide services to a framework 
of cooperation to meet the legislative burdens imposed by the state/federal governments. As far 
as I know, this is the only study linking legislative burdens and cooperation, at least in the field 
of public policies related to stormwater management. 
5.3 Limitations 
This dissertation has presented a multilevel governance framework for understanding the 
implementation of environmental policies in general and stormwater management policies in 
particular. However, the presented framework faces some limitations. Starting with the 
qualitative aspects related to the study of the relationship between institutional arrangements and 
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policy outcomes, there are challenges in the discrepancies found among the methods of 
monitoring water quality in the reports of the states under study. According to Keller and 
Cavallaro (2008), each state measures and monitors water quality differently. These differences 
may be among the most important threats to the generalization of the comparisons among the 
performances of the states. Therefore, the current study controlled for this threat by comparing 
each state's results independently via the comparison of a previous report with a later report. 
Another threat to generalizing the results is that the study sample is small (including only four 
states), and thus it may be impossible to generalize the results to all states. Therefore, one of the 
opportunities for future study is to investigate the possibility of a direct comparison of the quality 
of rainwater among states. In addition, a future study can increase the sample number to improve 
the generalizability of the results. 
Similar to the qualitative study, the quantitative study suffers from a threat to the 
generalizability of its results. The study sample is small and limited to a specific place and time. 
The study sample included only 119 cities in the north of Texas and belonging to one 
metropolitan area. The study sample lacks diversity among its members regarding geographical 
location and may not represent all the MS4 cities in the United States. On the other hand, there 
are no data available on the national level or the whole of Texas regarding cooperative relations 
of the MS4 cities. Therefore, future studies can improve the generalizability of results by 
including a more representative sample of the study population. 
All in all, stormwater management is a problem of collective action that has received 
great interest from legislators, researchers, and workers in the environmental sector. Although 
policies have been envisaged to reduce stormwater pollution, the problem continues to the 
present time and will continue along with continued urban development. However, the existence 
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of policies by themselves is not sufficient without finding appropriate arrangements for their 
implementation. Moving forward, for researchers and workers in this field, the proposed 
multilevel governance framework will facilitate a deeper understanding of implementation and 
compliance with stormwater management policy. Finally, the issue of stormwater management 
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Legislation Period Aim 





Flood control and water resource issues 
Swamp Land Act  The 1850s Flood control and water development 
Mississippi River 
Commission 1879 Flood control and water development 
Rivers and Harbors Act  1890 Flood control and water development 
General Mining Act  1866 Water resource allocation 
National Irrigation 
Association 1899 To accelerate federal construction of reservoirs in the West 
Reclamation Act  1902 
To authorize federal funds for the construction of reservoirs and water distribution facilitation in 
sixteen western states, with federal loans being paid by the farmers. The act protected state water 
rights; accordingly, the priority dates for water rights for reclamation projects are set in accordance 
with the law of the state where the water is diverted for the project. 
Federal Power Act  1920 This act licenses nonfederal power developments on navigable waters in the public domain and management of the sale of surplus power generated from federal dams. 
Rivers and Harbors Act  1925 To authorize the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers to survey all navigable waters and formulate general plans for irrigation, navigation, power production, and flood control 
Tennessee Valley 
Authority 1933 Developing the river for the benefit of the people 
National Resources 
Planning Board 1943 Executive coordination of water resources 
Water Pollution Control 
Act  1948 To reduce water pollution by point source discharge of industries 
McCarran Act  1952 To waive the sovereign immunity of the federal government and make state courts the forum for federal water claims 
Water Resources Council  1961 An interagency data-gathering and policy body designed to provide presidents with water policy advice 
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Legislation Period Aim 
Arizona v. California 1963 The U.S. Supreme Court recognized federal proprietary water rights. 
Water Resources 
Research Act 1964 To initiate the creation of water research centers at universities across the United States 
Water Resources 
Planning Act  1965 To attempt integrated water management and planning 
Water Resources Council 1965 A cabinet-level interagency planning and coordinating body 
National Water 
Commission 1968 To focus on conservation and water quality 
Federal Flood Insurance 
Act 1968 
To limit the types of buildings that can be insured on flood plains, allowing only those that can 
withstand periodic flooding without damage to be insured 
Clean Water Act 1972 
To establish a permit system for the discharge of pollutants, to be administered by the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA). 
To establish minimum principles and requirements that apply nationwide, supported by the federal 
government’s authority over navigable waters under the commerce clause of the U.S. Constitution 
Pacific Northwest 
Electric Power Planning 
and Conservation Act  
1980 To establish the Northwest Power Planning Council 
Northwest Power 
Planning Council 1980 
To strike a balance between energy needs and conservation of fish and wildlife in that 
region 
Water Resources 
Development Act 1986 
To increase responsibilities for states but decrease funds. 
New 50 percent cost-sharing requirements for Corps and Reclamation projects. 
To withdraw funds for water resource activities as sewage treatment plants, water development 
projects, dam safety programs, and water data collection 
Clean Water Act 1987 
A new funding strategy addressing water quality needs by building on EPA-state partnerships. 
To establish the National Estuary Program, a collaborative watershed approach for protecting 
coastal water quality 
California v. Federal 
Energy Regulatory 
Commission 
1990 U.S. Supreme Court ruling that state law cannot supplement federal flow requirements 
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Legislation Period Aim 
The Reclamation 
Projects Authorization 
and Adjustment Act  
1992 To decrease water flow to irrigation in California’s Central Valley Project (CVP) 
Water Resources 
Development Act  1992 
To provide federal funding for the restoration of Kissimmee River in Florida to its original 
meandering course 
Energy Power Act 1992 Includes conservation measures such as water efficiency standards for faucets, showerheads, and toilets 
Safe Drinking Water Act  1996 To give states more funding to comply with environmental standards and flexibility to exercise authority over drinking water standards and their enforcement 
Water Infrastructure 
Finance and Innovation 
Act 
2014 To establish the Water Infrastructure and Resiliency Finance Center to provide local governments and municipal utilities with financing mechanisms  
Source: Dolowitz (2015), Copeland (2006), Gerlak (2005), Adler (2009b), Baker (2009a).  
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